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INTRODUCTION 
This Article is part of an ongoing study of the behavior of American 
political institutions, including courts, with respect to federal civil litigation.1 
We are particularly interested in litigation that involves statutory private 
enforcement regimes and other legal provisions that predictably affect 
incentives and opportunities for access to federal court to enforce federal 
rights. We believe that, in order to understand the modern history of 
federal law that affects private enforcement and access to court with respect 
to federal rights (collectively, “private enforcement”), it is necessary to view 
the salient events in their institutional context, recognizing that the  
institutions involved are competing to regulate social and economic life in 
the United States. As part of our inquiry into how interactions and competition 
among institutions have produced the contemporary state of federal civil 
litigation—and in recognition of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure—we consider ways in which the federal judiciary 
has affected private enforcement through control of procedure.  
In Part I, we briefly discuss previously published evidence showing that, 
beginning in the late 1960s, when Democrats controlled Congress, there was 
a change toward greater reliance on private lawsuits to implement federal 
regulatory law. We highlight evidence that this transformation was rooted in 
conflict between Congress and the President over control of the bureaucracy, 
an alternative or supplementary venue to implement regulatory policy.  
 
© Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang 2014. 
† David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  
†† Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley.  
 Omar Madhany, University of Pennsylvania Law School Class of 2014, and Gregory Manas, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School Class of 2015, provided excellent research assistance.  
 We received helpful comments on a draft from Andrew Bradt, Cornell Clayton, Barry 
Friedman, Jonah Gelbach, Deborah Hensler, Robert Kagan, Herbert Kritzer, David Marcus, 
Richard Marcus, Joy Milligan, Alan Morrison, David Shapiro, and Tobias Wolff.  
1 We use the phrase “litigation reform” to denote efforts to reduce opportunities and incentives 
for private lawsuits. Because our concern is the private enforcement of federal rights, tort 
reform—the most frequent subject of academic attention to litigation reform—is outside the scope 
of this Article.  
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In Part II, we show that this program of regulation through private  
litigation soon met opposition primarily from the Republican Party. During 
President Reagan’s first year in office, the administration pressed an ambitious 
litigation reform proposal that would have restricted attorneys’ fees available 
to private parties seeking to enforce over one hundred federal statutes. 
Although this Reagan administration proposal failed, it signaled the  
emergence of a movement. 
Using an original data set of litigation reform bills spanning from 1973 
to 2010, we show that the ninety-seventh Congress (1981–1982) occasioned 
the emergence of litigation reform as a Republican issue in Congress. This 
campaign for litigation reform among congressional Republicans, like the 
Reagan proposal, largely failed. So long as Democrats controlled at least one 
chamber of Congress, Republicans’ litigation reform proposals had little 
chance of success. Even when Republicans secured control of both chambers 
(and for a time concurrently held the presidency), their litigation reform 
successes were modest and clustered in a few discrete policy areas. Congress 
proved inhospitable institutional terrain for the Republicans’ litigation reform 
agenda.  
In Part III, we show that the Supreme Court had greater success in the 
enterprise of litigation reform than did Republicans in the political branches. 
With an original data set of Supreme Court decisions on private rights of 
action, standing, attorneys’ fees, and arbitration, we map the Court’s 
behavior on private enforcement issues from 1970 to 2013. The data tell a 
story of transformation: once highly supportive of private enforcement, the 
Supreme Court, increasingly influenced by ideology and increasingly 
conservative, has become antagonistic.  
We argue that retrenchment through the judiciary achieved important 
success while failing in Congress because (1) as contrasted with the  
institutional fragmentation of the legislative process, the Court is governed 
by a more streamlined decisional process that allows bare majorities to 
prevail on contentious issues; (2) as contrasted with legislators’ and Presidents’ 
need to pay attention to democratic accountability through elections, federal 
judges are insulated from both; and (3) as contrasted with the powerful 
interest group mobilization that is triggered by the stark alternatives that 
major legislative reform proposals present, the case-by-case, less visible, 
more evolutionary process of legal change via court decision is far less likely 
to activate massive group mobilization seeking to block policy change. 
In Part IV, we turn to the impact of procedure on federal civil litigation 
reform. This is a lawmaking arena in which the judiciary has long been 
ceded considerable freedom and power—exercised primarily through the 
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promulgation of prospective, legislation-like rules of court. Starting in 1938 
and at least until the 1970s, court rulemaking was a potent means to affect 
private enforcement, and prior to the 1980s the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (“Federal Rules”) were litigation-friendly, and hence private 
enforcement–friendly.  
Federal court rulemaking started to engender serious controversy in the 
1970s with the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, and the controversy 
spread to the criminal and civil rules. We show that members of Congress, 
urged on by individuals and groups with different grievances (some of 
which had ideological and partisan valence), were concerned (1) that the 
rulemaking process was insufficiently inclusive and transparent; (2) that the 
rulemakers were paying inadequate attention to the Rules Enabling Act’s 
prohibition against abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive rights; 
and (3) that as a result, Congress was devoting too much time to rulemaking 
controversies. Chiefly through oversight hearings, these members of 
Congress pressured the federal judiciary to open up the process, and some 
of the process reforms, including a requirement of open meetings, were 
codified in 1988. They have made it more difficult to use the rulemaking 
process for major civil litigation reform.  
Hence, just as the Supreme Court has been more successful in constricting 
private enforcement through decisions than Congress has been through 
legislation, so too, we argue, has the Court’s power to make procedural law 
constraining private enforcement through decisions—specifically its power 
to “interpret” Federal Rules—been more consequential than its power to 
promulgate Federal Rules. Two of the most striking examples of this 
phenomenon, where the turn to decisional law seems clearly linked to the 
constrained state of rulemaking, are the Court’s 2007 and 2009 pleading 
decisions. 
Finally, just as ideology has had an increasing influence on the Justices’ 
votes and the Court’s decisions on private rights of action, attorneys’ fees, 
standing, and arbitration, so has it had an increasing influence on cases 
involving the Federal Rules. Ideology played a comparatively modest 
(although statistically significant and substantively important) role in the 
Justices’ voting behavior prior to 1994. Now, however, it appears to have a 
stronger influence on the Justices in Federal Rules cases—supposedly the 
heartland of procedure—than it has in cases presenting issues more  
obviously connected to substantive law.2  
 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 128-259. 
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I. THE RISE OF THE LITIGATION STATE 
In 2013, private parties filed about 170,000 federal lawsuits to enforce 
federal statutes, spanning the waterfront of federal regulation.3 Although 
Congress has relied on private litigation to enforce federal statutes since the 
rise of the federal regulatory state in the late 1880s, the frequency with 
which it has done so exploded in the late 1960s. From a rate of 3 lawsuits 
per 100,000 population in 1967—a rate that had been stable for a quarter 
century—it increased by about 1000% over the following three decades 
(reaching 13 by 1976, 21 by 1986, and 29 by 1996).4 Despite much vitriolic 
rhetoric (typically focused on tort litigation), serious empirical scholars have 
not established that there was a “litigation explosion” across American court 
systems as a whole during this period.5 There was, however, an unmistakable 
explosion of private lawsuits to enforce federal statutes.6 We emphasize two 
things about this phenomenon: First, it has resulted substantially from  
self-conscious choices of statutory design by members of Congress seeking 
to mobilize private enforcers. Second, among the multiple factors that led 
to these choices,7 Congress’s growing distrust of bureaucracy under  
leadership that it regarded as increasingly hostile to its policy goals was 
particularly important.  
It is a legislative choice to rely on private litigation in statutory  
implementation. In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, 
Congress decided to make the prohibition against job discrimination 
enforceable in court by including an express private right of action. When 
Congress chooses to rely on private enforcement, it faces a series of additional 
statutory design choices that together have profound consequences for how 
much or little private enforcement litigation is actually mobilized. These 
choices include who has standing to sue, which parties will bear the costs of 
litigation, what remedies will be available to prevailing plaintiffs, and 
whether a judge or jury will make factual determinations and assess damages. 
 
3 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: 
MARCH 31, 2013 tbl.C-2 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/ 
Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2013/tables/C02Mar13.pdf. 
4 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 15 (2010). 
5 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know 
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 61-62 
(1983); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1103 (1996). 
6 See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 4, at 118-19. 
7 The literature addressing other factors is discussed in Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & 
Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 645 (2013). 
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We refer to this system of rules as a statute’s “private enforcement regime.”8 
In Title VII, as amended in 1991, Congress sought to ensure active use of 
the private right of action by supplementing attorneys’ fee awards with, in 
certain cases, compensatory and punitive damages and the right to trial by 
jury. By design, Title VII is among the most litigated statutory provisions in 
federal court.9 
 
Figure 1: Private Enforcement Regimes, 1933–2004,  
and Private Statutory Litigation Rates, 1942–200410 
Figure 1 supports our claim that the growth in private litigation enforcing 
federal statues is a function of statutory design. The solid line reflects the 
cumulative number of fee-shifting provisions and damages enhancements 
(double, triple, or punitive) attached to private rights of action existing in 
federal statutory law in each year from 1933 to 2004. The line reflects the 
structural environment of private enforcement regimes in existence annually. The 
dashed line is the annual rate, per 100,000 population, of private federal 
statutory enforcement litigation (it is only possible to distinguish privately 
 
8 See FARHANG, supra note 4, at 19-60. 
9 See id. at 94-128, 172-213. 
10 Id. at 66. 
  
2014 Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach 1549 
 
from governmentally filed actions beginning in 1942). The strikingly close 
association between these two variables, and particularly the coincident 
sharp upward shift in both at the end of the 1960s, reinforces the  
significance of legislatively designed private enforcement regimes in 
mobilizing private litigants and creating the modern litigation state.11  
Congress’s choice of whether and how much to rely on private enforcement 
of statutory mandates must be understood in an institutional context. The 
primary alternative is to empower and fund administrative authorities to 
perform that enforcement function.12 Conflict between Congress and the 
President over control of the bureaucracy is a perennial feature of the 
American state, and this creates incentives for Congress, seeking an  
alternative or supplement to bureaucracy, to provide for enforcement via 
private litigation. This incentive increases with the degree to which  
Congress distrusts the President to use the bureaucracy to carry out statutory 
mandates.13 Private enforcement is thus a form of insurance against the 
President’s failure to use the bureaucracy to carry out Congress’s will.  
This reason to choose private enforcement has become much more  
significant to American public policy since the late 1960s, when divided 
party control of the legislative and executive branches became the norm and 
relations between Congress and the President became more antagonistic. In 
the first sixty-eight years of the twentieth century, the parties divided 
control of the legislative and executive branches 21% of the time. In the 
subsequent thirty-two years (from Richard Nixon through George W. 
Bush), the figure was 81%. Growing ideological polarization between the 
parties exacerbated the institutional antagonism arising from divided 
government.14 Both quantitative and qualitative empirical scholarship have 
demonstrated that these political–institutional conditions were critically 
 
11 For a discussion of the data underlying Figure 1, see id. at 3-18, 60-84.  
12 See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Admin-
istrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982); Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s 
Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363 (2010); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice 
Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006).  
13 See FARHANG, supra note 4, at 36-37; see also THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS,  
LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
96-97 (2002); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 
93-94 (2001); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 
49 (1994); R. Shep Melnick, From Tax and Spend to Mandate and Sue: Liberalism After the Great 
Society, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 387, 405-06 (Sidney 
M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2005). 
14 See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: 
THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 194 (2006); Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan  
Polarization in Presidential Support: The Electoral Connection, 30 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1, 3-4 (2003). 
  
1550 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1543 
 
important in causing the greater congressional reliance on private litigation 
to enforce federal statutes that is reflected in Figure 1.15 
Moreover, it is important to the story we tell that the chief configuration 
was Democratic Congresses facing Republican Presidents in the years of 
divided government from Richard Nixon’s assumption of office through the 
end of George W. Bush’s presidency. Thus, the Democratic Party, with its 
stronger propensity to undertake social and economic regulation16 and with 
liberal public interest groups occupying a critical position in the party 
coalition, predominately controlled Congress.17 This legislative coalition 
largely faced an executive branch in the hands of the Republican Party, a 
party more likely to oppose social and economic regulation and for which 
business groups are a core constituency.18 If antagonism between Congress 
and the President encourages private enforcement regimes, this will be 
especially consequential when the more regulation-prone Democratic Party 
controls Congress and the less regulation-prone Republican Party controls 
the presidency. The bulk of the foundation for the litigation state was laid 
under this configuration of divided government.19  
Although the genesis and growth of the litigation state have received 
extensive attention in recent years, we take up the little-studied responses 
that they have elicited from partisan and ideological adversaries and those 
seeking to serve different institutional interests. Especially little attention 
has been paid to the phenomenon that is central in the second half of this 
Article: how the trans-substantive Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 
become a site of struggle and contest by interest groups, legislators,  
rulemakers, and judges who seek to control the procedural playing field on which 
private enforcement proceeds, thereby influencing its volume and effects.20 
 
15 See generally FARHANG, supra note 4; Sean Farhang, Legislative-Executive Conflict and  
Private Statutory Litigation in the United States: Evidence from Labor, Civil Rights, and Environmental 
Law, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657 (2012). 
16 See generally KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A  
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). 
17 See MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE STATE: THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL 
EXPERIENCE 86-94 (1994); DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER 
OF BUSINESS IN AMERICA 93-112 (1989) [hereinafter VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES]; David 
Vogel, The “New” Social Regulation in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN 
PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 155, 169-73 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981). 
18 See, e.g., VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES, supra note 17, at 240-42. 
19 See generally Sean Farhang, Regulation, Litigation, and Reform, in THE POLITICS OF  
MAJOR POLICY REFORM IN POSTWAR AMERICA ( Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Sidney M. Milkis eds.) 
( f orthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2184562.  
20 An exception is Sarah Staszak, Institutions, Rulemaking, and the Politics of Judicial Retrenchment, 
24 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 168 (2010), which considers rulemaking among litigation reform 
responses to the growth of the litigation state.  
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Surveying these responses requires that we traverse multiple institutional 
sites of conflict over the scope and trajectory of the litigation state.  
II. THE LEGISLATIVE PROJECT OF LITIGATION REFORM 
A. The Reagan Administration 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, a deregulatory movement was afoot, 
primarily catalyzed by businesses, trade associations, state and local officials, 
and newly emergent conservative public interest groups. President Reagan 
came to power on the wave of this movement. It was clear that regulatory 
reform was high on the policy agenda from the outset of his administration.21  
Leaders of the Reagan administration well understood that private  
enforcement of federal regulatory statutes had been growing steeply, and they 
saw it as an obstacle to their regulatory reform agenda. Statutory provisions 
that forced business and government to pay the attorneys’ fees of plaintiffs 
who launched invasive, disruptive, and costly lawsuits were a particular 
target of criticism. Conservative activists and leading business associations 
also believed that liberal public interest groups used litigation and courts to 
shape the substantive meaning of the new social regulatory statutes to their 
liking, thereby making regulatory policy that was injurious to the interests 
of business and government.22 
Conservative activists and business associations mobilized and collaborated 
in forming a number of public interest law groups to pursue an agenda 
focused, in part, on limiting the new social regulation.23 Reagan’s close 
associates, including high-ranking members of his California gubernatorial 
administration who followed him to the White House, were instrumental in 
founding this movement.24 Indeed, litigation by liberal public interest 
groups against the Reagan gubernatorial administration provoked members 
of his administration to establish the first conservative public interest law 
 
21 See Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REV. 253, 261 
(1986); see also Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public 
Interest Law, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483, 493-94 (1984). See generally Jefferson Decker, Lawyers 
for Reagan: The Conservative Litigation Movement and American Government, 1971–87 (2009) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University), available at http://search.proquest.com/ 
docview/304863269?accountid=14707. 
22 See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE  
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 60-66 (2008); Michael S. Greve, Why “Defunding the Left” Failed, 
PUB. INT., Fall 1987, at 91, 91; O’Connor & Epstein, supra note 21, at 493-94; Decker, supra note 21, at 15. 
23 See supra note 22. 
24 See TELES, supra note 22, at 60-61; O’Connor & Epstein, supra note 21, at 495; Decker, 
supra note 21, at 54-76. 
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group in Sacramento—the Pacific Legal Foundation—which then served as 
a model for many others.25 Reagan himself was openly hostile to liberal 
public interest lawyers, characterizing them in the early to mid-1970s as “a 
bunch of ideological ambulance chasers doing their own thing at the  
expense of the . . . poor who actually need help”26 and as “working for  
left-wing special interest groups at the expense of the public.”27 Moreover, 
he appointed numerous leaders and activists from the emergent conservative 
public interest law movement to important positions in the federal  
bureaucracy.28 These individuals had witnessed the rate of private  
enforcement lawsuits under federal statutes increase by 352% between Nixon’s 
assumption of office in 1969 and Reagan’s in 1981.29 Once in power, they 
sought to retrench private enforcement, in part, through a legislative project 
of litigation reform.30  
Attention to litigation reform in the first years of the Reagan  
administration focused squarely on federal rights, not torts. A 1981 bill 
capping fees in all federal actions against the government cut across virtually 
all fields of federal statutory regulation.31 Also in Reagan’s first term, the 
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy drafted a proposal that would 
have, among other things, curtailed fee awards for actions under section 
1983, which provides for damages suits against state officials for violating 
federal rights.32 Discussion of the proposal elicited further suggestions to 
eliminate punitive damages and introduce a good faith defense.33 Tort law 
was not an issue on the Reagan administration’s agenda until 1985, when it 
made tort reform a policy priority by forming the Tort Policy Working 
Group. In 1986, the Working Group issued a report calling for a series of 
 
25 See TELES, supra note 22, at 61-62; O’Connor & Epstein, supra note 21, at 495; Ronald A. 
Zumbrun, Life, Liberty, and Property Rights, in BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE: THE 
STORY OF THE FREEDOM-BASED PUBLIC INTEREST LAW MOVEMENT 41, 42-43 (Lee 
Edwards ed., 2004); Decker, supra note 21, at 57-62.  
26 Ronald J. Ostrow, Legal Services Agency Battles Reagan Attempt to Cut Off Its Funding, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1981, at B1. 
27 Decker, supra note 21, at 74. 
28 See id. at 155, 238, 242-45, 250, 255-56. 
29 See supra Figure 1. 
30 In characterizing anti-litigation reform as retrenchment, we follow Sarah Staszak. Although 
Staszak focused broadly on retrenchment of judicial power and autonomy, we focus narrowly on 
retrenchment of private enforcement of federal rights. These are different issues. For Staszak, 
diminution of judicial power over rulemaking would be retrenchment of judicial power even if its 
effect was to preserve or enlarge the enforcement of rights. See Staszak, supra note 20, at 169, 173. 
Our concepts of retrenchment are overlapping but distinct.  
31 See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see Decker, supra note 21, at 180-84. 
33 Decker, supra note 21, at 183-84. 
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reforms, including limits on fees and caps on damages.34 Litigation reform 
with respect to federal rights came first for the Reagan administration, and 
tort reform followed.  
According to Michael Greve, a conservative legal activist and founder of 
the Center for Individual Rights, the Reagan administration saw federal 
statutory private rights of action with attorneys’ fee awards as an obstacle to 
deregulation. Conservative activists pursued proposals to curtail fee awards 
under federal regulatory statutes and to reduce sources of funding for liberal 
public interest groups as part of a strategy to “defund the Left.”35  
Private enforcement litigation was a “primary obstacle” to Reagan’s 
deregulatory agenda because, with little prospect of actually being able to 
repeal or modify legislative mandates, his principal strategy for effectuating 
the agenda was to demobilize the administrative regulatory enforcement 
apparatus.36 The value of withdrawing administrative enforcement would be 
weakened if extensive private enforcement continued. Based upon archival 
research, Jefferson Decker finds that some important members of the 
Reagan bureaucracy were deeply concerned that private rights of action, 
coupled with fee shifting in the new social regulatory statutes, were producing 
“a state-sponsored, private governing apparatus” that was beyond the 
control of the elected branches.37  
Advocates of retrenching private enforcement recognized that the  
proliferation of fee-shifting provisions in the 1970s had produced a private 
enforcement infrastructure not just among liberal public interest groups, 
but also, more significantly, among the for-profit American bar. Our own 
archival research reveals that this trend became an important concern 
among advocates of retrenching private enforcement, articulated repeatedly 
in support of an administration legislative proposal to cap fee awards. 
Michael Horowtiz, general counsel of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), played a leading role in developing the fee-cap proposal. In 
 
34 John J. Farley, III, Robin Hood Jurisprudence: The Triumph of Equity in American Tort Law, 65 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 997, 1015-16 (1991); Paul Taylor, The Federalist Papers, The Commerce Clause, 
and Federal Tort Reform, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 357, 358 n.5 (2012). Professor Yeazell notes that 
President Carter proposed civil litigation reform in 1978, advocating “alternative dispute resolution, 
no-fault auto insurance and divorce regimes—all rational, government-sponsored alternatives,” but 
that “[n]othing happened, and no subsequent Democrat has taken up that banner.” Stephen C. 
Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Maligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two Cultures of Civil 
Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1774-75 (2013). 
35 See generally Greve, supra note 22. 
36 See FARHANG, supra note 4, at 172-213; ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,  
REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 119-32 (1983); VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES, supra note 17, 
at 246-65; Farhang, supra note 19; Greve, supra note 22, at 101-04; McGarity, supra note 21, at 260-70. 
37 See Decker, supra note 21, at 181. 
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a 1983 memo discussing the problem that the proposal sought to address, 
Horowitz explained, “Not only the ‘public interest’ movement but, more 
alarmingly, the entire legal profession is becoming increasingly dependent on 
fees generated by an open-ended ‘private Attorney General’ role that is 
authorized under more than 100 statutes,” a large portion of which were 
enacted in the 1970s.38  
Writing to OMB Director David Stockman, Horowitz characterized the 
fee-cap bill as “designed in part to bar fee awards to entrepreneurial  
attorneys who now engage in contingency litigation” under federal statutes. 
“A literal industry of public interest law firms has developed,” he continued, 
“as a result of the legal fee awards with such groups regarding attorney’s fees 
as a permanent financing mechanism,” and one central to their commercial 
viability and business model.39  
John Roberts, then working for the Reagan Justice Department, was  
another active participant in deliberations over the fee-cap bill.40  
Notwithstanding differences of opinion within the administration about the 
political wisdom of pursuing the bill, Roberts joined those advocating for it. 
In explaining why, he stated, “This legislation will, of course, be opposed by 
the self-styled public interest bar, but the abuses that have arisen in the 
award of attorney’s fees against the government clearly demand remedial 
action.”41 Antonin Scalia also endorsed the fee bill. Writing as a University 
of Chicago law professor and editor of the conservative Regulation magazine 
( just months before his appointment to the D.C. Circuit), he argued that 
recent D.C. Circuit pro-fee award decisions were a “bad dream” in need of 
the administration’s legislative remedy and that the bill would surely be 
opposed by the “private attorney general industry.”42 As we shall see, 
Roberts and Scalia would become among the most anti–private enforcement 
Justices on the modern Supreme Court. 
 
38 Memorandum from Mike Horowitz to Dick Hauser & Bob Kabel ( June 16, 1983) (on file 
with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).  
39 Memorandum from Michael J. Horowitz to David A. Stockman & Edwin Harper ( July 
22, 1982) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).  
40 See generally John G. Roberts, Jr. Papers, Box 5, Folders 1-3 (Attorneys’ Fees); Box 31, Folders 1-3 
(Legal Fees Reform Act) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library). Reagan Library logs 
indicating that memoranda written by Roberts are withheld from public view under the  
deliberative-process privilege further reflect Roberts’ substantive participation in debates over the bill.  
41 Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred F. Fielding (Sept. 19, 1983) (on file with the 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library); see also Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred F. 
Fielding (Nov. 17, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).  
42 See The Private Attorney General Industry: Doing Well by Doing Good, REG., May/June 1982, 
at 5, 5-7; Memorandum from Michael J. Horowitz to David A. Stockman & Edwin Harper, supra 
note 39; id. at exhibit H. 
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Reagan administration advocates of retrenching private enforcement 
were surely right. For-profit counsel, not interest groups, prosecute the vast 
majority of federal statutory private suits.43 Thus, to the extent that 
Reagan’s sought-after “regulatory relief ” involved less aggressive and 
stringent enforcement of existing statutory mandates, the for-profit bar’s 
response to market incentives was part of the problem. 
 OMB’s fee-cap bill focused on suits against federal and state government 
defendants. Initially titled “The Limitation of Legal Fees Awards Act of 
1981,” the bill proposed amending over one hundred federal statutes  
allowing recovery of attorneys’ fees in successful suits against the government. 
The bill went through a number of permutations from 1981 to 1984. Some 
core attributes of the early versions were (1) a fee cap of $53 per hour for 
private attorneys representing paying clients; (2) a bar on fee awards for 
public interest organizations with staff attorneys, legal services organizations 
receiving federal funds, or for-profit attorneys representing plaintiffs on a 
pro bono basis; and (3) a reduction of the $53 per hour fee award by 25% of 
any money judgment or to the extent that it was disproportionate to the 
plaintiff ’s actual damages.44 
Although this proposal’s restrictions on fee awards were quite extreme as 
applied to suits against the government, it did not attempt to restrict fees in 
suits against the private (business) sector. It appears that key actors in the 
Reagan administration also wanted a more expansive retrenchment extending 
to the private sector.45 If the proposal summarized above had been enacted, 
it likely would have been the thin end of the retrenchment wedge. This was 
not to be.  
B. Litigation Reform Proposals in Congress 
In order to map the legislative movement for litigation reform and its 
partisan configuration, we identified all bills that sought to amend federal 
law so as to (1) reduce the availability of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs or 
increase plaintiffs’ liability for defendants’ fees, (2) reduce the monetary 
damages that plaintiffs can recover, (3) reduce opportunities and incentives 
for class actions, (4) strengthen the operation of sanctions against counsel, 
and (5) strengthen the operation of offer of judgment rules. These  
 
43 See FARHANG, supra note 4, at 3-18. 
44 See Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest 
Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 242-43 (1984); Fred Barbash, . . . And Uncle Sam 
Wants to Save on His Legal Fees, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1982, at A25; Memorandum from Michael 
J. Horowitz to David A. Stockman & Edwin Harper, supra note 39, at exhibits B, C.   
45 See Greve, supra note 22, at 92-93; Decker, supra note 21, at 179-88.  
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provisions fall into two groups. The fees and damages provisions seek to 
reduce directly the economic recovery available to successful private enforcers. 
The class action, sanctions, and offer of judgment provisions seek to modify 
the Federal Rules in ways that disadvantage private enforcers.46 
Our search captured 503 bills from 1973 (when the Library of Congress 
bill database starts) to 2010. Thirty percent of these bills contained more 
than one litigation reform item, with an average of 1.4 items per bill. The 
bills had an average of 11 cosponsors, yielding a total of 6063 episodes of 
legislators sponsoring or cosponsoring a bill with a litigation reform item in 
it. There were 3620 episodes of legislators supporting a bill with a provision 
limiting damages, 2835 with an attorneys’ fee provision, and 2257 with 
procedural provisions. Fifty-nine percent of the members of Congress who 
served from 1973 to 2010 supported one of our litigation reform provisions 
at least once.  
In order to analyze the relationship between legislators’ ideology and the 
likelihood that they would support anti-litigation proposals, we constructed 
the following data set. Separately for each of our items and for each legislator 
who served in Congress from 1973 to 2010, we calculated the total number of 
episodes of sponsorship or cosponsorship per Congress. That is, the unit of 
analysis is a Congress-legislator count of the total number of times that each 
legislator in each Congress sponsored or cosponsored one of our five 
items.47 Figure 2 fits a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) 
curve to the count, per Congress, of the total number of episodes of legislator 
support for anti-litigation provisions; the aggregation of proposals to reduce 
damages and fees (monetary recoveries); and the aggregation of proposals 
to change class action, sanctions, and offer of judgment rules (procedural 
rules).48 
 
 
 
 
46 We excluded bills that sought to affect incentives for asserting rights in administrative 
proceedings or for judicial review of administrative action. Our focus is on private lawsuits to 
enforce federal rights against the objects of statutory regulation.  
47 We include both sponsors and cosponsors because we are interested in the degree of legislative 
support for litigation reform proposals. To neglect cosponsors would be to treat a bill that a 
legislator introduces only for herself as equivalent to one that dozens of other members of 
Congress wish to support. 
48 We use 80% bandwidth to estimate all LOWESS curves in this Article.  
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Figure 2: Legislator Support for Anti-Litigation Provisions 
 
Two things stand out in these data. First, support for anti-litigation bills 
grew strongly in the Reagan years. Because the curve smooths over  
year-to-year fluctuations, it does not reveal sharp breaks in the data, and 
thus the raw underlying data are instructive. During the Carter presidency, 
there was an average of 70 episodes per Congress of legislative support for 
one of our anti-litigation items. In Reagan’s first term, the figure rose to 257 
per Congress, and in his second term it rose to 463 per Congress—a 561% 
increase over the Carter years. This growth continued and peaked at 1038 in 
the 104th Congress (1995–1996), when Republicans took control. It has since 
declined considerably, continuing its downward slope to the present.  
Second, in the first half of the 1980s, episodes of support for procedural 
proposals were negligible in number and flat, while fees and damages 
proposals exploded. Procedural proposals, however, grew significantly 
starting in the early 1990s. The raw Congress-level counts again tell the 
story. In Ronald Reagan’s second term, there were only 18 episodes per 
Congress of support for anti-litigation procedural proposals. In George 
H.W. Bush’s term in office, the number rose to 62 per Congress, and in Bill 
Clinton’s first term the figure grew to 360, more than a 1900% increase over 
Reagan’s second term. It peaked at 582 in the 105th Congress (1997–1998) 
and subsequently declined, a trend continuing to the present. 
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Figure 3: Legislator Support for Anti-Litigation Provisions, by Party 
 
Finally, Figure 3 provides an initial sense of the significance of ideology 
and party affiliation by presenting separate regression curves for the number 
of Democratic and Republican sponsors and cosponsors. There was little 
difference between Democratic and Republican support until the early 
1980s, when Reagan took office. The raw data reveal that, in the four 
Congresses from 1973 to 1980, the number of Democratic supporters 
actually exceeded the number of Republican supporters, but only marginally. 
The ninety-seventh Congress (1981–1982) is the first in our data set in 
which Republican support for anti-litigation measures exceeds Democratic 
support. From rough parity when Reagan took office, there emerged a 
partisan gap which grew until it peaked in the 105th Congress (1995–1996), 
with Republicans supporting anti-litigation proposals at a level about 563% 
above Democrats. As the level of Republican proposals declined after the 
105th Congress, so too did the gap between the two parties.49  
 
49 Note that Figure 3 is based on raw figures of support and does not attempt to make adjustments 
for the share of seats controlled by each party. 
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As with the Reagan administration’s litigation reform proposals, our bill 
database shows that proposals in the field of federal rights led the way and 
tort reform followed. We collected bills containing the same set of five 
litigation reform items applying to state tort law. From 1973 through 1984 
(the end of Reagan’s first term), episodes of sponsorship and cosponsorship 
of bill provisions targeting federal statutory rights outnumbered those 
targeting tort by a margin of more than three to one. Only in the  
ninety-ninth Congress (1985–1986), corresponding exactly to Reagan’s 
embrace of tort reform, did episodes of support for tort reform surge in 
Congress to levels rivaling, and sometimes surpassing, proposals targeting 
federal rights. 
In order to test systematically the relationship between legislator party 
and legislator support for anti–private enforcement proposals, we use 
negative binomial count models. We code 0 for Democrats and 1 for  
We employ Congress fixed effects to address the possibility of Republicans. 
potential confounding factors, including the political and public salience of 
the private enforcement issue, the lobbying priorities of business and state 
governments that may wish to reduce private enforcement pressures, and 
This approach leverages only variation in the relationship election cycles. 
between legislators’ party and their votes within Congresses to estimate the 
effects of party.  
We suggest in Section II.A that the Reagan administration’s fee bill  
appeared to mark an important juncture in the Republican Party’s  
anti–private enforcement campaign. The congressional session corresponding 
to Reagan’s first two years in office was the first session of Congress in our 
data set in which Republican support for anti-litigation proposals exceeded 
Democratic support. In our statistical models, we subset the data by time 
periods in order to assess the effect of party before and after Reagan’s 
assumption of office.  
  We estimate separate negative binomial count models for (1) the pooled 
number of episodes of support for all five types of anti-litigation provisions; 
(2) the aggregation of proposals to reduce damages and fees (monetary 
recoveries); and (3) the aggregation of proposals to change class action, 
sanctions, and offer of judgment rules (procedural rules). We discuss 
modeling specifications and choices in the Appendix. In Table 1, we  
estimate the effects of legislator party on support for anti–private  
enforcement provisions for the period from 1973 to 1980. We find no 
statistically significant party effect in either the model for pooled episodes 
or the model for monetary recoveries. We do, however, find a statistically 
significant effect with respect to procedural provisions. Yet the sign on the 
  
1560 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1543 
 
Democratscoefficient reflects that  were more likely to support such bills. We 
do not make much of this result because only about 4% of members per 
Congress sponsored such a bill during this period—procedure had not yet 
emerged as a locus of significant bill activity. The key point is that prior to 
Reagan, litigation reform was an area of scarce legislative activity, and to the 
extent that it was an issue, it was not a Republican issue.  
 
Table 1: Negative Binomial Model of Legislator Support for  
Anti–Private Enforcement Provisions with Congress Fixed Effects, 1973–1980 
 
 
All Bills 
Monetary 
Recoveries Procedure 
 Coef. Marginal Coef. Marginal Coef. Marginal 
   
Party -.235 -26% -.109 -12% -1.43** -318% 
 (.117) (.176) (.528)  
 
(Congress fixed effects not displayed)
N= 2154 2154 2154
Adj. Dev. R2= .10 .06 .24
**.01; *<.05  
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on legislator
 
–In Table 2, we estimate the same model for the 1981 2010 period. Things 
change greatly. The party variable is statistically significant in the expected 
direction in all three models: all types of provisions pooled, those reducing 
monetary recoveries only, and those affecting procedural issues only. In the 
All Bills model, moving from Democratic to Republican is associated with 
an increase in legislators’ predicted count by 222%. The figure is 216% in the 
Monetary Recoveries model and 274% in the Procedure model. Interestingly, 
the effect of party on the level of support is highest among the procedural 
provisions.  
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Table 2: Negative Binomial Model of Legislator Support for Anti–Private 
Enforcement Provisions with Congress Fixed Effects, 1981–2010 
 
 
All Bills 
Monetary 
Recoveries Procedure 
 Coef. Marginal Coef. Marginal Coef. Marginal 
   
Party 1.17** 222% 1.15** 216% 1.32** 274% 
 (.051) (.051) (.073)  
 
(Congress fixed effects not displayed)
N= 8093 8093 8093  
Adj. Dev. R2= .26 .22 .42  
**.01; *<.05 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on legislator 
  
Our negative binomial models pool data over about thirty years, raising 
two obvious questions: First, is the party effect present throughout this 
period? Second, has its magnitude changed over time? In order to answer 
these questions, we summarize the results from a series of models over time 
We aggregated the two Congresses associated with each  in Table 3. 
presidential term from 1981 to 2008 (Ronald Reagan’s first term to George 
W. Bush’s second term).50 The marginal effects column reflects the percent 
increase in  legislators’ predicted count moving from Democratic to  
 Republican. Table 3 shows that, with respect to the fees and damages bills, 
the party effects are significant within each of the seven presidential terms. 
The magnitude of the party effect grew over the Reagan-Bush years and 
peaked in Bill Clinton’s first term; it has since declined, though it remains 
large. In contrast, the effect of party on legislators’ support for  
anti-litigation procedural items took slightly longer to emerge. There was 
no statistically significant effect with respect to the procedural items in 
Reagan’s first term. By his second term, however, the party effect emerged as 
durably statistically significant, and by the 2000s, it was actually larger than 
the effect for monetary recoveries.  
 
 
 
50 Our data do not yet extend through President Obama’s first administration.  
  
1562 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1543 
 
Table 3: Negative Binomial Coefficients for Legislator Party in Models of 
Legislator Support for Anti–Private Enforcement Provisions, with  
Congress Fixed Effects, by Presidential Administration 
C. The Failure of the Legislative Project of Litigation Reform 
The legislative project of litigation reform mounted by the Republican 
Party was largely a failure. Reagan’s fee bill was unable to gain traction, 
even in the Republican-controlled Senate. Numerous proposals by  
congressional Republicans fared little better in the ensuing years, even when 
Republicans controlled both chambers of Congress. Some were  
trans-substantive bills that would have cut across the whole landscape of the 
litigation state, including bills requiring federal courts to award attorneys’ 
fees to prevailing defendants in all civil actions51 or to impose a general 
loser-pays fee-shifting rule.52 Another trans-substantive proposal would 
have capped punitive damages in all civil actions in federal court against 
small businesses, while increasing the burden of proof for establishing 
entitlement to such damages.53  
 
51 See, e.g., Frivolous Suit Reduction Act of 1995, H.R. 64, 104th Cong. (1995); Frivolous Suit 
Reduction Act of 1994, H.R. 5189, 103d Cong. (1994).  
52 See, e.g., Loser Pays Legal Fee Fairness Act, H.R. 3497, 109th Cong. (2005); Loser Pays 
Act of 1993, H.R. 2880, 103d Cong. (1993). 
53 See, e.g., Small Business Lawsuit Abuse Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3382, 105th Cong. 
(1998); see also Small Business Liability Reform Act of 2001, S. 865, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 
All Bills 
Monetary 
Recoveries 
 
Procedure 
 Coef. Marginal Coef. Marginal Coef. Marginal 
  
Reagan I (1981–1984) .450** 57% .478** 61% .092 10% 
Reagan II (1985–1988) .806** 124% .799** 122% .982* 167% 
H.W. Bush (1989–1992) .912** 149% 1.04** 183% .445* 56% 
Clinton I (1993–1996) 1.77** 487% 2.0** 639% 1.44** 322% 
Clinton II (1999–2000) 1.21** 235% 1.21** 235% 1.22** 239% 
W. Bush I (2001–2004) 1.05** 186% .821** 127% 1.72** 458% 
W. Bush II (2005–2008) 1.60** 395% 1.50** 348% 2.0** 639% 
 
**.01; *<.05  
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Many other Republican proposals targeted particularly active areas of 
federal civil litigation and sought to reduce economic incentives to bring 
cases: A 1981 bill proposed full immunity from civil damages suits for police 
officers who conducted illegal searches and seizures in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.54 A 1982 bill proposed to repeal the attorneys’  
fee–shifting provision in the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 
1976.55 A 1987 bill proposed to amend the Clayton Act to reduce the amount 
recoverable in many private antitrust actions from treble to actual damages.56 
A 1992 bill proposed to eliminate class actions under the Truth in Lending 
Act.57 
Although a substantial majority of the Republicans’ procedural proposals 
would have amended specific statutes, some were trans-substantive. Of 25 
trans-substantive procedural bills in our data, 14 were proposals to bolster 
sanctions under Rule 11, and a substantial majority of these sought to 
reverse the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 by making sanctions mandatory 
rather than discretionary.58 The remaining 11 bills targeted Rule 23, and a 
substantial majority of those were precursors to the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005.59  
Republican successes were few in number. Three are well known: the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,60 the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1996,61 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).62 
We do not diminish the significance of these laws. However, excluding the 
jurisdictional provisions of CAFA, which themselves do not directly affect 
federal rights,63 the three are narrowly focused.  
 
54 H.R. 4259 proposed to amend titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code to eliminate, and 
provide an alternative to, the exclusionary rule in Federal criminal proceedings. H.R. 4259, 97th 
Cong. (1981). 
55 Judicial Reform Act of 1982, S. 3018, 97th Cong. (1982). 
56 Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987, H.R. 1155, 100th Cong. (1987). 
57 Community Bank Regulatory Relief Act of 1992, S. 2794, 102d Cong. (1992). 
58 See, e.g., Small Business Growth Act of 2007, H.R. 1012, 110th Cong. (2007); Civil Justice 
Fairness Act of 1995, S. 672, 104th Cong. (1995). 
59 See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004); Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2000, S. 353, 106th Cong. (2000). 
60 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
61 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 
28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
62 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
63 CAFA significantly increased the number of state law class actions that were governed by a 
trans-substantive and ever-more-conservative federal class action jurisprudence. It therefore may 
have encouraged anti–private enforcement class action jurisprudence that also governs enforcement 
of federal rights.  
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Beyond these major laws, only eight more Republican-proposed 
litigation reform bills in our database passed. More telling than their 
number is how limited the bills were in substantive scope. They included 
three antitrust bills limiting multiple damages: one in 1982 applying only to 
actions by foreign governments,64 one in 1984 applying only to narrowly 
defined “joint research and development venture[s],”65 and one in 2004 
applying only to antitrust violators who report their own cartel activity to 
the Justice Department and cooperate in its ensuing investigation.66 They 
also included three bills limiting fee awards to disabled students or their 
families suing schools: two of these capped only fee awards paid from 
monies appropriated for the District of Columbia in each of two years, 
without permanent limits,67 and the third limited fee recovery by (or 
imposed some fee liability on) plaintiffs’ counsel for frivolous or unreasonable 
litigation behavior.68 In 1995, a Republican-proposed bill passed, imposing a 
five-month moratorium on certain consumer class actions, again with no 
permanent effects.69 In 1996, a Republican proposal passed, foreclosing fee 
awards in section 1983 actions against judges for actions taken while acting 
in a judicial capacity.70  
In sum, Republican litigation reform successes across the issues in our 
database, over the three decades from the emergence of the issue on the 
Republican agenda in 1981 until 2010, nibbled around the edges of the 
litigation state. They did not challenge it. To understand the substantial 
failure of the legislative project of litigation reform, it is useful to observe a 
couple of institutional factors that make retrenchment of rights difficult. An 
institutionally fragmented American separation of powers system empowers 
many actors to block legislative reform, making legislative change difficult 
 
64 Act of December 29, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-393, 96 Stat. 1964 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012)). 
65 National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, § 2(a)(6), 98 Stat. 1815, 
1815 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012)). 
66 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 
§§ 106–107, 118 Stat. 661, 664-65 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4304–4305 (2012)). 
67 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of 
Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119 Stat. 2396 
(2005); District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-335, 118 Stat. 1322 (2004). 
68 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 
§ 615(i)(3), 118 Stat. 2647, 2724-25 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012)). 
69 Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-12, § 2, 109 Stat. 161, 
161 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2012)). 
70 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012)). 
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on contentious issues and leading to the stickiness of the status quo.71 This 
is especially true when the legal change sought involves divesting groups of 
existing rights, and even more so when those rights enjoy a broad base of 
support in the polity.72 The phenomenon of “negativity bias” (or an  
“endowment effect”) means that people are substantially more likely to 
mobilize to avoid losses of existing rights and interests, as compared to 
securing new ones. It also leads voters to be more likely to punish  
politicians who have impaired their interests than to reward politicians who 
have benefited them, making retrenchment electorally hazardous. Politicians 
well understand this dynamic.73  
These forces make a private enforcement status quo, once constructed, 
extremely difficult to retrench. A number of high-ranking members of the 
Reagan administration regarded the political costs of the move to retrench 
private enforcement as much too high. They foresaw opponents successfully 
turning the battle into one over the preservation of substantive rights 
protected by the statutes to be amended—rights to be free of racial and 
gender discrimination, to be shielded from predatory business practices, to 
drink clean water, and to breathe clean air. The same forces frustrated the 
administration’s efforts to build a coalition behind a retrenchment bill.  
Attorney General William French Smith observed that striking too  
severely at attorneys’ fee awards risked “excessive controversy.”74 He 
emphasized that in the public-relations battle, the Administration would be 
cast as “anti” rights, citing as examples attacks by civil rights and  
environmental groups.75 Opponents of the proposal would be able to beat it 
back with “the rhetoric of rights and Justice,” as one supporter put it.76 
Smith also observed that the timing of the bill seemed particularly bad with 
an election on the horizon.77 When the bill was sent to be cleared in  
 
71 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 213, 229-30 (1990); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE 
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? ( John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).  
72 See PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER, AND 
THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 17-19 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Virtual 
Logrolling: How the Court, Congress, and the States Multiply Rights, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1545, 1560 (1995). 
See generally Jacob Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of 
Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243 (2004). 
73 PIERSON, supra note 72, at 39-46; Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 72, at 1560-62. See 
generally Hacker, supra note 72. 
74 Memorandum from William French Smith, Att’y Gen., to The Cabinet Council on Legal 
Policy 5 ( June 15, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library). 
75 Id. at 2. 
76 Greve, supra note 22, at 104. 
77 See Memorandum from William French Smith to The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, 
supra note 74, at 2. 
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December 1983, Fred Fielding, Counsel to the President, echoed Attorney 
General Smith’s skepticism and stated that he was “deeply concerned” that 
it would “open another front in the ongoing battle over our record” concerning 
the rights of “minorities, the poor, and the aged.”78 
The political difficulty of retrenching existing rights was also evident in 
the failure of the administration’s strategy for building a coalition around 
the bill. Although the administration naturally anticipated opposition from 
public interest groups and plaintiffs’ lawyers, it expected support from both 
states and business. With respect to states, it anticipated support because 
the bill would preserve state and city tax resources against fee awards and 
reduce incentives for suits against states and cities. However, two of the 
three groups representing state and city officials, whose support the  
administration sought, either declined to support the bill or threatened to 
oppose it publicly. To at least some officials, given the broad popularity of 
the rights that the fee bill would reach, the prospect of avoiding some of the 
costs of litigation was not sufficient to warrant the political hazards of 
supporting it.79  
Perhaps more surprising, the fee proposal threatened, as one administration 
strategy memo put it, to provoke the “wrath of the small business community,” 
which is an important part of the Republican coalition.80 Ironically, small 
businesses had themselves developed an interest in fee awards under the 
Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, a law spearheaded by both Republicans 
and business that provides fee awards for small businesses (among others) 
that prevail against the federal government in proceedings in which they 
challenge the legitimacy of federal regulatory actions.81 When the fee-cap 
 
78 Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Richard G. Darman, 
Assistant to the President (Dec. 16, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library). 
For additional expressions of this concern, see Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to 
the President, to Richard G. Darman, Assistant to the President & Deputy to the Chief of Staff 
(Sept. 21, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).  
79 Farhang, supra note 19, at 26-29; Memorandum from Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Office of Legal Policy, to Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Att’y Gen. (Oct. 27, 1983) (on file 
with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library); see, e.g., Memorandum from Mike Horowtiz to Lee 
Verstandig & Rick Neal (Oct. 19, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library); 
Memorandum from Mike Horowitz to Dick Hauser & Bob Kabel, supra note 38. 
80 Memorandum from Jonathan C. Rose to Edward C. Schmults, supra note 79; see also 
Memorandum from Michael J. Horowitz to David A. Stockman & Edwin Harper, supra note 39; 
Memorandum from William French Smith to The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, supra note 74. 
81 Susan Gluck Mezey and Susan M. Olson, Fee Shifting and Public Policy: The Equal Access to 
Justice Act, 77 JUDICATURE 13, 13-16 (1993); Arlene S. Ragozin, The Waiver of Immunity in the Equal 
Access to Justice Act: Clarifying Opaque Language, 61 WASH. L. REV. 217, 219-21 (1986); Gregory C. 
Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable 
Government Conduct (pt. 1), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 220-29, 280 n.396 (1994). 
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bill became public, small business groups came out strenuously against it, 
accusing the administration of “break[ing] faith with the small business 
community.”82 
In light of the overall political calculus surrounding retrenchment of 
existing rights, it is not surprising that the fee-capping bill was ultimately 
unable to attract the support of moderates in Congress, including moderate 
Republicans.83 Even if they were inclined to join the administration’s attack 
on the private enforcement infrastructure, the political and electoral 
calculus was against it. After the bill’s initial failure, the administration 
developed a compromise version in an effort to enlarge support. In 1984, a 
Republican-controlled Senate committee held hearings on the bill. The 
committee chairman, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, described 
statutory fee-shifting rules as creating “exorbitant windfalls for lawyers,” 
leading to an “explosion of litigation” that had “clogged the courts.”84 Hatch, 
however, was unable to muster support from even his own Republican-controlled 
committee, where the bill died.  
D. The Alternative Pathway of Courts 
Many scholars have observed that the Reagan administration’s  
law reform objectives were profoundly inhibited by Democratic control of 
one or both chambers of Congress.85 One particular strand of work is 
relevant to the long-run inter-institutional story of litigation reform we tell 
in this Article. That strand argues, we believe persuasively, that the Reagan 
administration saw the federal judiciary as an important alternative avenue 
to effect legal change that could not be accomplished through Congress. As 
Professor Graber put it, “[t]he Reagan administration sought to achieve its 
social agenda primarily by staffing the Justice department and judiciary with 
movement conservatives.”86 It sought thereby to lay the foundation for law 
 
82 Small-Business Groups Protest Reagan’s Veto of Bill for Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 3. 
83 See Decker, supra note 21, at 184; Memorandum from Jonathan C. Rose to Edward C. 
Schmults, supra note 79; Memorandum from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Edwin 
Meese III, Counselor to the President (Oct. 31, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library). 
84 The Legal Fee Equity Act: Hearing on S. 2802 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1-3 (1984) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
85 See supra note 36. 
86 Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 63 (1993); see also SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL 
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 285-358 
(1997); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: 
THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. 
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reform through federal litigation and federal judges—without the aid of 
legislators. Although this claim has generally focused on the administration’s 
constitutional commitments, we argue that the strategy played out on the 
issue of litigation reform as well.  
Writing to then-Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, Deputy  
Attorney General Edward Schmults expressed both his skepticism that 
Congress could achieve litigation reform via statutory amendment, and his 
optimism that the Supreme Court could achieve the underlying goals via 
statutory interpretation. About the Reagan fee bill, he wrote: 
From a political standpoint, . . . it is probable that a serious fee reform bill 
would sharply divide Congress . . . [and] like other controversial legislation, 
it is unlikely that the bill would be enacted into law. . . . As in the past, real 
progress in curtailing abuses in the award of attorneys’ fees is likely to be 
gained through the Supreme Court, where we have enjoyed considerable 
success in recent years. . . . An administration fee reform bill will bring to 
the public eye many of the policies we have been espousing before the 
courts.87 
Schmults went on to detail successful efforts by the Justice Department 
to curtail statutory fee awards in civil rights, employment, and environmental 
litigation in federal courts, including the Supreme Court. In the next Part, 
we show that Schmults was correct.  
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S RESPONSE 
A. The Existing Literature 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence affecting private litigation has been 
a frequent topic of attention by scholars, particularly over the last decade. 
Although some of the literature has focused on civil rights and other areas 
in which Congress has sought to promote private enforcement of federal 
law,88 other articles have broadened the field of inquiry to include court 
 
HISTORY 226-27 (2007); Walter F. Murphy, Reagan's Judicial Strategy, in LOOKING BACK ON 
THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY 207, 219-21 (Larry Berman ed., 1990); David M. O’Brien, The Reagan 
Judges: His Most Enduring Legacy?, in THE REAGAN LEGACY: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 60,  
60-67 (Charles O. Jones ed., 1988); J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court 
and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. POL. 233, 241-42 (2004). 
87 Memorandum from Edward C. Schmults to Edwin Meese III, supra note 83, at 3. 
88 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 185.  
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access more generally.89 This literature has usually focused on the recent 
past, particularly the Rehnquist Court. Much of it asserts or assumes that 
the phenomenon in question is a manifestation of the ideological  
preferences of an increasingly conservative Supreme Court.90 With a few 
notable exceptions, there has been little attention to other possible  
influences on the results.91 None of the work of which we are aware deploys 
statistical analysis of systematic data.92 
Perhaps the most comprehensive contribution to this literature is  
Professor Andrew Siegel’s interesting article arguing that hostility to 
litigation best explains the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court.93 The 
author starts by surveying various scholarly attempts to capture the distinctive 
attributes of the Rehnquist Court (or Courts, as some scholars see two, and 
a few three, distinct periods during Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice), 
including federalism, advancement of conservative social and political 
values, judicial supremacy, and others.94 He argues that some of those 
accounts are “under-theorized”95 and that all of them miss one unifying 
theme in the Court’s jurisprudence in the Rehnquist years, namely, hostility 
to litigation96—a theme that helps to explain some otherwise inconsistent 
results.97 
Although Professor Siegel is generally careful not to exclude the  
operation of other influences,98 he does not deal seriously with institutional 
considerations, such as the role of precedent and attention to the state of the 
docket of the lower federal courts. Moreover, his references to the  
 
89 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 317, 318 
(2012); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing 
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV 1097, 1117-18 (2006).  
90 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Door to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 537, 540, 556 (2003). But see Lee Epstein, William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1433 (2013) (“[T]here is no uniform 
conservative or uniform liberal ideology. Instead there are multiple imperfectly overlapping 
ideologies.”). 
91 But see Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 823-40 (2011) 
(exploring a phenomenon the author calls “judicial backlash” and arguing that judicial concerns about 
overcrowded dockets and inadequate resources may cause the judiciary to seek to thwart congressional 
private-enforcement regimes through statutory interpretation and judicial control of procedure, 
particularly if the claims involved are otherwise disfavored); Siegel, supra note 89, at 1115-17.   
92 But cf. Epstein et al., supra note 90, at 1448-70 (reporting the authors’ analysis of data to 
test various claims about the business friendliness of the Roberts Court). 
93 See generally Siegel, supra note 89. 
94 See generally id.  
95 Id. at 1104. 
96 See id. at 1112-16. 
97 See id. at 1152-53. 
98 See id. at 1108.  
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“pointillist”99 approach he takes signal realization that his data are not 
systematic, at least as presented. Indeed, for some of the areas he discusses, 
the selection seems designed to make his points.100  
We are particularly interested in Professor Siegel’s empirical claims 
about the role that liberal Justices have played in the phenomenon he 
describes. Refusing to assume that possible connections between “the 
Court’s hostility to litigation and the Justices’ instinctual distaste for the 
modern plaintiffs’ bar . . . stem directly or even principally from partisan 
politics,” the author adduces the “frequent participation—and occasional 
leadership—of the Court’s more liberal members in shaping a Court 
fundamentally hostile to litigation” as evidence of the need for a “more 
nuanced explanation.”101 He argues that any “prior ideological commitments” 
underlying the Court’s hostility to litigation “are just as likely to stem from 
the Justices’ class position or professional and educational experiences as 
from their partisan political allegiance.”102 We agree that the Justices’ 
ideological preferences need not stem from “partisan political allegiance,” 
although they may do so.103 But such a strong claim about liberal Justices’ 
role “in shaping” a hostile Court cries out for systematic evidence. In that 
regard, we note the author’s conclusion that “the political valence of the 
Court’s decisions seems sufficiently correlated to the results of the case to 
demand careful historical consideration.”104 
B. The Justices’ Votes in Private Enforcement Cases 
We endeavored to collect systematic data with which to evaluate the voting 
behavior of Justices concerning private enforcement (defined to include 
access to court). We identified issues that have been commonly associated 
with private enforcement, including in the literature discussed above. For 
the period from 1970 to 2013,105 we identified all Supreme Court decisions 
requiring Justices to vote on (1) the existence or scope of a private right of 
action, either express or implied; (2) whether a party has standing to sue, 
under either Article III or prudential analysis; (3) the availability of  
 
99 Id. at 1097, 1149, 1202. 
100 See id. at 1118, 1124-29. 
101 Id. at 1116. 
102 Id. at 1117. 
103 See Yeazell, supra note 34, at 1788 (“The recently concluded 2012 presidential campaign 
was the first in decades in which the topic of civil litigation appeared neither in party platforms 
nor in the candidates’ stump speeches.”). 
104 Siegel, supra note 89, at 1200. 
105 The data collection occurred before all 2013 cases had become available, and thus our cases 
for that year only are incomplete.  
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attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff; and (4) whether an arbitration 
agreement forecloses access to court to enforce a federal right. We regard 
this body of cases, when pooled, as a strong measure of Justices’ more 
general treatment of private enforcement.106  
Having identified this set of cases, we coded the votes of each Justice as 
pro–private enforcement (=1), anti–private enforcement (=0), or missing if 
the Justice did not address the private enforcement issue. We treated votes 
as pro–private enforcement if they favored recognition of an express or 
implied private right of action, found that standing requirements were 
satisfied, took an approach favorable to plaintiffs’ fee awards relative to 
other options presented by the case, or concluded that a plaintiff should 
have access to enforce federal rights in court rather than being restricted to 
arbitration. We treated votes in the opposite direction as anti–private 
enforcement. At least one of the authors read each majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinion in order to assign codes to Justices’ votes. 
Our search yielded 241 cases: 80 presented a private right of action 
issue, 95 a standing issue, 56 a fee issue, and 15 an arbitration issue. Some 
cases contained multiple discrete private enforcement issues across and 
within our issue areas. The unit of analysis in our statistical models is the 
Justice’s vote on the private enforcement issue. The 241 total cases captured 
by our search contained 266 issues. This rendered a total of 2298 Justice 
votes on private enforcement issues.  
Our primary interest was to model the relationship between Justices’ 
ideological preferences and their votes on private enforcement issues. For 
our measure of Justice ideology, we rely upon Martin–Quinn scores. These 
“ideal point” scores for the Justices are based on the voting behavior and 
alignments of Justices in non-unanimous decisions.107 They are fluid, 
changing from one term to the next in accordance with changes in Justices’ 
voting behavior over time. Higher values are associated with more  
conservative Justices. Use of these scores allows us to assess empirically 
whether private enforcement belongs in the family of issues associated with 
the left–right divide, such as civil rights and economic regulation. In an 
ancillary analysis reported in the Appendix, we obtain substantially similar 
results to those presented below (in Table 5) when substituting Segal–Cover 
scores for Martin–Quinn scores. Segal–Cover scores are based on  
 
106 We included such cases in our data only to the extent that they involved suits directly 
against the objects of legal regulation, and thus we excluded judicial review of administrative 
action. We also excluded cases in which the Court’s analysis applied equally to public and private 
enforcers.  
107 See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). 
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pre-confirmation newspaper editorials on the nominations, and thus are 
independent of Justices’ voting behavior.108  
 
Table 4: Percent Pro–Private Enforcement Votes in Private Right of Action, 
Standing, Attorneys’ Fees, and Arbitration Cases  
 
 
 
Justice 
Pro–Private  
Enforcement 
Votes (%)
 
Number 
of Issues
 
 
Conservative
Average 
Martin–Quinn 
Score 
  
Thomas 24 86 1 4.14 
Alito 25 32 1 2.68 
Roberts 27 33 1 2.39 
Scalia 29 133 1 2.92 
Rehnquist 35 223 1 2.86 
Kennedy 38 123 1 .986 
O’Connor 38 150 1 .900 
Burger 41 128 1 1.85 
Powell 42 118 1 .924 
White 52 184 1 .587 
Stewart 54 83 1 .478 
Souter 58 80 0 -.814 
Breyer 63 75 0 -.698 
Ginsburg 65 79 0 -.875 
Sotomayor 69 13 0 .241 
Blackmun 70 182 0 -.184 
Stevens 72 216 0 -1.47 
Kagan 78 9 0 .333 
Marshall 78 172 0 -3.16 
Brennan 81 167 0 -2.74 
Douglas 91 35 0 -6.57 
 
 
  Table 4 lists the raw proportion of pro–private enforcement votes, 
relative to total votes, for each Justice who voted in more than five cases in 
our data. Two things stand out: First, the distribution from lowest to 
highest pro–private enforcement votes appears straightforwardly to track 
 
108 See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). 
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the conservative–liberal dimension. The four most anti–private enforcement 
scores are those of Thomas, Alito, Roberts, and Scalia. We note that of the 
21 Justices listed, two of the four most anti–private enforcement Justices 
(Roberts and Scalia) were advocates of the unsuccessful Reagan fee bill. The 
four most pro–private enforcement scores are those of Stevens, Marshall, 
Brennan, and Douglas. White and Stewart are in the center of the Court. 
The table also indicates whether a Justice is “conservative” (=1) or “liberal” 
(=0), dividing them according to whether they are above or below the 
median of the average annual Martin–Quinn score for Justices in our data. 
Justices above (more conservative than) the median are Stewart, Harlan, 
White, Powell, Kennedy, O’Connor, Burger, Roberts, Alito, Scalia, 
Rehnquist, and Thomas. Justices below (more liberal than) the median are 
Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, Blackmun, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan. This simple division of the Justices above and below 
the Martin–Quinn median maps to Republican and Democratic appointments, 
with the exception of Justices widely regarded as having departed from 
expectations: White is classified as a conservative in this division, and 
Brennan, Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens are classified as liberals.  
Any dichotomous ideology variable is surely a blunt instrument, and we 
use more granular measures in our statistical models. However, looking at a 
simple and plausible dichotomous ideology measure is a good first reality 
check on both the underlying continuous measure and on our data. The 
Martin–Quinn median divides the Justices into two categories that do an 
extremely good job of predicting whether a Justice is above or below the 
median ratio of pro–private enforcement votes. The conservative–liberal 
dichotomy yielded by the Martin–Quinn scores perfectly divides our ratio 
of pro–private enforcement votes in the following sense: every “conservative” 
has a lower pro–private enforcement voting rate than every “liberal.” A 
second notable feature of the table is the large disparity between conservative 
and liberal Justices’ voting ratios. The scale ranges from Thomas voting in 
favor of private enforcement 24% of the time, to Douglas voting in favor of 
private enforcement 91% of the time, and there is a roughly continuous 
distribution of Justices between the two poles.  
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Figure 4: Case Outcomes and Justice Votes in Private Enforcement Cases 
 
Figure 4 plots a LOWESS line estimating the probability of an outcome 
in favor of private enforcement, and the separate probabilities of conservative 
and liberal Justices’ votes in favor of private enforcement. The figure 
reflects that the estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement  
outcome has undergone a long decline, from 68% in 1970 to 18% in 2013. 
This decline has been substantially driven by the votes of conservative 
Justices, whose estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement vote 
declined from 65% to 18% over this period. The probability of a pro–private 
enforcement vote declined for liberal Justices by a much smaller degree, 
falling from an estimated 83% in 1970 to 66% in the late 1990s, when it 
turned back up and grew to 71% by 2013. Thus, over the full period, the 
conservative decline of 47 percentage points was about quadruple the liberal 
decline of 12 percentage points. Conservative Justices achieved a five-Justice 
majority in 1972 and have held it since, with the exception of a six-Justice 
majority from 1991 to 1993. By 2013, the Court’s private enforcement 
outcomes converge with the votes of conservative Justices.  
Further, the difference, or the ideological distance, between liberal and 
conservative Justices’ voting in private enforcement cases grew over the 
period we examine, widening from 18 percentage points in 1970 to 33 
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percentage points in the early 1980s. That difference remained stable until 
around 2000, when it began growing again until reaching a 53 percentage 
point difference by 2013. 
It is informative to contrast the patterns displayed in Figure 4 with the same 
patterns occurring in the full body of the Court’s civil actions asserting federal 
rights. To do so, we draw upon the Spaeth Supreme Court Database.109  
 
Figure 5: Case Outcomes and Justice Votes in All Civil Federal Rights Cases 
 
Figure 5 depicts the estimated probability of a liberal case outcome in 
civil actions asserting federal rights, as well as the estimated probability of a 
liberal vote separately for liberal and conservative Justices. Although there 
was a long-run 11 percentage point decline in the probability of a liberal 
outcome from 1970 to 2013, it was markedly smaller than the 50 percentage 
point decline in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote over the 
same period. Further, although the difference between liberal and  
conservative Justices’ voting in federal rights cases gradually widened from 
15 to 20 percentage points over the course of the 1970s, it has since grown 
 
109 In the Spaeth data, available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/, we used cases with the “law type” 
variable coded as federal statutory or constitutional, and excluded cases with the “issue area” 
variable coded criminal.  
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only an additional 3 percentage points. As compared to this 8 percentage 
point growth in the difference between liberal and conservative voting in all 
federal rights cases over the full period, there was a 35 percentage point 
growth in private enforcement cases. 
In our private enforcement cases, as compared to all civil cases asserting 
federal rights, the difference in voting between liberal and conservative 
Justices started out at similar levels in 1970, but then grew markedly larger 
in private enforcement cases by the early 1980s, where it stabilized until the 
end of the 1990s. It then accelerated sharply, with liberal and conservative 
Justices’ voting separated by 53 percentage points by 2013—more than 
double the difference of 23 percentage points we observe in all civil actions 
asserting federal rights. Thus, the sharp decline in pro–private enforcement 
outcomes, and the polarization we observe on these issues between liberal 
and conservative Justices in recent years, do not track rulings in civil 
litigation of federal rights more generally. These effects are distinctive in 
private enforcement cases. Below we suggest an explanation for this notable 
disparity. 
 
Figure 6: Private Enforcement Cases per Term, and Proportion with Dissents 
  Figure 6 reflects LOWESS estimates of the number of private enforcement 
cases in our data that were decided each year, and the proportion of them in 
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which there was a dissent. The estimated number of such cases on the 
Court’s docket grew from the early 1970s and peaked in the 1980s; it then 
declined until the early 2000s and plateaued until the present time. The 
percentage of cases with dissents has been relatively stable over the whole 
period, with predicted values ranging between 58% and 65%. The declining 
number of private enforcement cases on the docket and the relatively stable 
dissent rate are notable for purposes of comparison with cases interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are discussed in Part IV. 
We next construct a model using the votes of Justices on the private  
enforcement issues as our dependent variable and the Justices’ ideology 
scores as our key independent variable. In addition to the direct incorporation 
of the ideology measure into our model, we also assess whether ideology 
had a greater effect on Justices’ votes on private enforcement issues after 
1994. We do so for several reasons. First, Republicans took Congress in the 
1994 elections and have held at least one chamber almost continuously since, 
materially reducing the probability of legislative override. The logic of this 
theory is that Justices’ votes may be constrained by the perceived threat of 
legislative override, and the diminution of that threat after 1994 may have 
widened their perceived range of policymaking discretion.110 Certainly, 
shortly prior to 1994 and in response to many of its civil rights decisions 
bearing on private enforcement, the Court had experienced a vigorously 
negative congressional response in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.111  
In addition, there is a plausible case to be made that civil litigation  
reform grew to be a more salient issue in the Republican party, and the 
locus of more partisan conflict, at about the same time, playing a notable 
role in Gingrich’s “Contract with America” in the 1994 campaign, and in the 
Republican legislative program in 1995.112 Finally, simply looking at Figure 
4 reveals growing distance between liberal and conservative Justices  
beginning not long after 1995, suggesting the need to address this temporal 
dimension of the data in our empirical models.  
We therefore create a variable that takes the value of 0 from 1970 to 
1994, and 1 after 1994, and interact it with the Martin–Quinn ideology 
 
110 See Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the  
Supreme Court’s Constitutional Rulings, 1987–2000, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533, 548 (2006). 
111 See FARHANG, supra note 4, at 129-71. 
112 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1185 
& n.533 (2001); Carl Tobias, Reforming Common Sense Legal Reforms, 30 CONN. L. REV. 537 (1998). 
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score. This interaction term tests whether ideology had a different effect on 
Justices’ votes on private enforcement issues after 1994.  
 We use case fixed effects to address the possibility of potential  
confounding factors ranging from case facts, to the clarity or indeterminacy 
of precedent, to changing institutional and political conditions. This 
approach leverages only variation in the relationship between Justices’ 
ideology and their votes within cases to estimate the effects of ideology.  
Although this approach allows us to estimate the effect of ideology most 
effectively, it comes at the cost that we cannot estimate the effects of 
variables that take the same value for each vote in the case. Still, the case 
fixed effects approach absorbs and holds constant any such influence, and in 
that sense, our estimates of the effects of ideology are net of any case-level or 
institutional variables that would take the same value for each Justice in a case.  
Another limitation of case fixed effects is that it uses only information 
from cases with variation across Justices’ votes, meaning that it can be used 
only for cases with a dissent. There are dissents in 60% of our cases, and 
thus dissents on private enforcement issues are the norm rather than the 
exception and our fixed effect models use most of our data. Nevertheless, 
the statistical models we use to estimate the effect of ideology on Justices’ 
votes are analyzing only cases in which there was at least one dissenter. That 
said, we emphasize that the LOWESS plots in Figure 4, depicting trends in 
private enforcement case outcomes and liberal versus conservative Justices’ 
votes, are based on all of our cases, not just those containing dissents.  
 
Table 5: Logit Model of Justice Votes in Private Enforcement Cases,  
with Case Fixed Effects 
 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect 
  
Ideology (Martin–Quinn) -.66** -.09 
 (.09)  
Ideology*Post-1994 Dummy -.51* -.07 
 (.21)  
  
N= 1739  
Pseudo R2= .39  
**<.01; *<.05  
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Justice 
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Table 5 reports a logit model with case fixed effects. Further details of 
modeling specifications and choices are provided in the Appendix. The 
main effect of the ideology variable is significant. Because of the inclusion 
of the interaction, this variable reflects the effect of ideology only in the 
period from 1970 to 1994. The marginal effect for the coefficient is -.09, 
which means that for each unit increase in a Justice’s Martin–Quinn score 
(which becomes more conservative as it increases), there is a corresponding 
reduction of 9% in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote. To 
put this in substantive perspective, the distance between the mean ideology 
scores of conservative and liberal Justices (as defined above) is approximately 
3.53. An increase of this magnitude in the ideology score moving in the 
conservative direction is associated with a 32% reduction in the probability 
of a pro–private enforcement vote.  
The effect of ideology in the 1995 to 2013 period is given by summing 
the marginal effects of ideology (-.09) and its interaction with the post-1994 
dummy variable (-.07), rendering a net marginal effect of -.16. In the period 
from 1995 to 2013, the reduction in the probability of a pro–private  
enforcement vote associated with moving from a liberal to a conservative 
Justice is 57%. Relative to the average effect of ideology on Justices’ votes 
from 1970 to 1994, it is 78% larger in the 1995 to 2013 period. It is evident 
that the effect of ideology on private enforcement votes became increasingly 
powerful over the last two decades. We discuss alternative specifications 
with the Segal–Cover scores substituted for the Martin–Quinn scores in the 
Appendix, where we observe similar results.  
To attribute the Court’s decisions in these areas exclusively to the 
 ideological preferences of the Justices, however, would neglect “the  
messiness of lived experience,”113 which teaches that judges—even judges on 
a court that has the final word on matters of constitutional law—make 
decisions based on a number of considerations, including the law as they 
understand it. The many unanimous decisions that the Supreme Court 
issues every year likely reflect the influence of law, including precedent,114 
and the Justices’ belief in rule of law values, including stability and  
predictability.115  
 
113 Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science, and Humility, 
in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT 
STAKE 41, 53 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) [hereinafter Burbank, Judicial Behaviors]. 
114 See id. at 47; Frank B. Cross, Law Is Politics, in id. at 92, 100. 
115 See Burbank, Judicial Behaviors, supra note 113, at 56; Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, 
The Influence of Law in the Supreme Court’s Search-and-Seizure Jurisprudence, 33 AM. POL. RES. 33, 
35 (2005). 
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In cases implicating the volume and mix of litigation, institutional  
self-interest is another consideration or influence that may affect a Justice’s 
vote. Supreme Court Justices are surely aware of the supposed workload of 
the lower federal courts, some determinants of which are canvassed each 
year in the Chief Justice’s Year-End Report.116 Finding a suitable proxy for 
what we have termed “the supposed workload of the lower federal courts,” 
however, is difficult.117 This helps to explain our choice of a statistical 
approach that allows us to control for all variables that take the same value 
for each Justice in the case (such as caseload in the federal courts), but that 
permits analysis only of cases in which there is a division of the Justices. 
C. Why the Court Succeeded Where Republicans  
in the Political Branches Failed 
The Supreme Court, which became increasingly conservative as a result 
of appointments by Republican Presidents over the period we study, had 
greater success in the enterprise of litigation reform than did Republicans in 
the political branches. Although gauging the actual effects of the Court’s 
decisions on litigation is complex, difficult, and beyond the scope of this 
Article, it is clear that the Court was more successful than Republican 
legislative reformers in shaping law in the direction of litigation reform. The 
Court’s posture toward private enforcement underwent a transformation 
from highly supportive in the early 1970s to antagonistic today. Why did the 
Court succeed where Republican reformers in the other branches failed? We 
believe that four institutional considerations are especially important.  
First, as contrasted with the institutional fragmentation of the legislative 
process, the Court is governed by a more streamlined decisional process and 
simple voting rules, making a slim majority comparatively more capable of 
unilateral action on controversial issues.118 Four Justices suffice to put an 
issue on the Court’s agenda, and bare majorities routinely win in decided 
cases, while they rarely do to enact legislation.119 This allows the Court to 
succeed in achieving policy objectives that are derailed in Congress.  
 
116 There is a summary of annual case filing statistics in all such reports for the years 2000 
through 2013, which is available online at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/ 
year-endreports.aspx. 
117 For the complexities of determining federal judicial workload, particularly given the  
institutional judiciary’s goal of attracting more resources from Congress, see Stephen B. Burbank, S. 
Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, 
What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23-31 (2012).  
118 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 86, at 124-34. 
119 See generally McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); Moe, supra note 71. 
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Second, in contrast to legislators and Presidents who need to pay  
attention to democratic accountability through elections, federal judges are 
insulated from both, again allowing the Court to act more decisively on 
divisive issues.120 In Part II, we suggest that some Reagan administration 
leaders and congressional Republicans saw potentially threatening electoral 
repercussions associated with litigation reform and the attendant charges of 
retrenching popular rights. Justices are institutionally positioned to weather 
such charges without threat to their continuation in office. The Court’s 
electoral insulation and streamlined decisional and voting rules are especially 
advantageous when advancing a policy agenda as to which elements of a 
potential legislative coalition are internally divided,121 such as when  
Republican proponents of the fee bill were unable to marshal the support of 
moderate Republicans, small business, and state interests.  
Third, although significant legislative reform proposals often present 
stark alternatives that trigger powerful interest group mobilization, the 
case-by-case, less visible, more evolutionary process of legal change via 
court decision is far less likely to trigger group mobilization than a major 
legislative intervention.122 It is therefore less likely to be obstructed.123 A 
large transformation in private enforcement resulted from a succession of 
individual Court decisions, none of which may have appeared monumental 
in isolation. 
The last two points are linked in an important way. The claim that the 
Court is less responsive to democratic pressures does not mean that it is not 
conscious of them at all. Many scholars have suggested that the Court 
recognizes that its public standing and legitimacy are important to its 
 
120 See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal 
Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 521 (2002); Graber, supra note 
86, at 65-68. 
121 See Graber, supra note 86, at 65-68. 
122 See id. See generally JEB BARNES & THOMAS F. BURKE, HOW POLICY SHAPES  
POLITICS: RIGHTS, COURTS, LITIGATION, AND THE STRUGGLE OVER INJURY COMPENSATION 
(forthcoming 2015).  
123 Scholars have suggested a number of indirect pathways through which interest group 
mobilization might be pertinent to federal judicial decisionmaking, ranging from Justices’ desire to 
please elite audiences, see LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 89-90 (2006), to stimulating legislative attacks on the Court, see Gerald N. 
Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 376-78 (1992), 
to affecting the Court’s perception of its public legitimacy, see generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE 
WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT 
AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).  
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institutional power.124 Thus, relatively broad public support for many 
regulatory rights, combined with the phenomenon of negativity bias, likely 
places some limits on the Court’s perceived discretion to scale back substantive 
statutory rights by attacking them directly. From the standpoint of public 
legitimacy, the strategy of focusing on seemingly technical and legalistic 
issues, such as fee awards, standing, arbitration, and procedural rules, would 
seem a far better approach. When the Court is engaged in apparently 
procedural and legalistic decisionmaking, the public perceives it as more 
objective, neutral, and legitimate.125 Indeed, the public is less likely to notice 
such decisions at all. This may explain the great disparity between the 
Court’s overall decisions on federal rights and its decisions concerning 
private enforcement of federal rights, with the dramatically harder turn to 
the right in the latter set of cases.  
Focusing on welfare state retrenchment, Jacob Hacker has noted that, 
because of obstacles to overtly retrenching rights and programs with a 
substantial base of support, developments toward retrenchment in the 
welfare state have taken the form of strategically chosen “subterranean,” 
“covert,” and “hidden” processes that often involve lower-visibility decisions 
of bureaucrats in the course of administering a statute without formally 
changing it.126 Similarly, Paul Pierson suggests the possibility that a process 
of retrenchment may be “invisible at the surface” while producing  
“long-term erosion”—like “termites working on a foundation.”127 The 
Court’s treatment of opportunities and incentives for access to court to 
enforce rights over the past four decades has this quality. 
 
 
124 See generally, e.g., TOM CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (2011); 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 123; Matthew C. Stephenson, Court of Public Opinion: Government 
Accountability and Judicial Independence, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 379 (2004).  
125 See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 32 (2003); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment 
Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
91, 104 (2000). See generally John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public 
Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928 (2000). 
126 See generally Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The 
Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243 (2004). 
We thank Sarah Staszak for suggesting this point to us. 
127 Paul Pierson, The Rise and Reconfiguration of Activist Government, in THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 19, 33 
(Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007). 
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IV. THE ROLE OF PROCEDURE IN THE MOBILIZATION OR 
DEMOBILIZATION OF CIVIL LITIGATION 
A. The Federal Rules, 1938–1970: Opening the Courthouse Door 
The systematic evidence that we present in Part III supports and refines 
qualitative accounts of the Court’s hostility to private enforcement over the 
last three decades, and it supports the view that the Court’s decisions have 
had an increasingly ideological dimension.128 Much of the data on which our 
analysis is based, however, are drawn from cases interpreting federal 
statutes. If one is interested in the federal judiciary’s ability to influence 
private enforcement, it would be foolish to neglect the legal domain over 
which it has long been ceded the first, and for many decades essentially the 
final, word: federal procedural law.129  
The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective four 
years after the successful conclusion of a decades-long campaign to give the 
Court power to make prospective, legislation-like rules for the conduct of 
civil actions at law in the lower federal courts, akin to the rulemaking power 
it had long exercised under statutory delegation for suits in equity.130 
Promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,131 following more than 
two years of work by an Advisory Committee appointed by the Court, the 
Federal Rules merged law and equity procedure, and equity emerged very 
much the senior partner.132 
The 1938 Federal Rules were litigation-friendly. To some extent, this was 
due to the influence of equity procedure, with the circumstances creating 
equity jurisdiction requiring (or the lack of a jury permitting) tolerance of 
claim and party joinder and of factual and legal ambiguity.133 One of those 
circumstances made discovery, albeit limited in scope, essential, namely, the 
effect of common law rules categorically excluding relevant evidence on a 
 
128 See supra Part III. 
129 Here, as is usually the case when one posits dichotomies involving “procedure,” numerous 
qualifications are in order. Some may view one of the case categories in the database for Part III—
standing—as “procedural,” and Professor Lemos even treats decisions interpreting statutory 
attorneys’ fees provisions under that rubric. See Lemos, supra note 91, at 828. Indeed, it was partly to 
reduce room for argument on that score that we consider in this Part only the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and cases interpreting them.  
130 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1035-98 
(1982) [hereinafter Burbank, Rules Enabling Act]. 
131 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012)). 
132 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922-26 (1987). 
133 See id. at 922. 
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party’s ability to prove a claim or defense at trial.134 In addition, equity’s 
appetite for ambiguity and complexity served a hunger for justice,  
something that could hardly be said of the common law system of pleading.  
It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the capacity of the 1938  
Federal Rules to open the courthouse door primarily to the influence of 
equity procedure. In that respect, they are better seen as embodying the 
jurisprudential and social commitments of the individuals who were  
responsible for drafting them.135 In rejecting common law pleading, with its 
obsessive quest to reach a single issue regardless of the facts, and code 
pleading, with its insistence on pleading all facts necessary to constitute a 
cause of action, the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules embraced the insights 
of legal realism.136 Pleadings are an inferior method to find out what 
actually happened (and if, as in common law procedure, they are often an 
exercise in fiction, they are useless for that purpose).  
Of course, implementing the view that pleading should play but a minor 
role in litigation required other means to ascertain facts that did not share 
the inefficiencies of the common law trial. For that, the architects of the 
1938 Federal Rules wrote rules that afforded much broader discovery than 
had been available in equity or in any of the merged systems in the states.137 
Such broad discovery appealed to the empirical commitments of the Legal 
Realists. But it also appealed to the commitments of the Progressive 
movement in American law, of which the chief architect of the Federal 
Rules on discovery had long been a proponent.138 The Progressives gained 
prominence in the early twentieth century, reacting to the excesses of the 
 
134 See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN  
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 204, 207 (1952). 
135 The most important members for this purpose were Charles E. Clark, the Reporter and 
Dean of Yale Law School, and Edson R. Sunderland, a professor at the University of Michigan 
Law School. On Clark, see Subrin, supra note 132, at 961-73. On Sunderland, see Stephen B. 
Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or 
Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 596-603 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank, Vanishing 
Trials]. For an interesting article arguing that “there is a strong connection between the rise of 
Legal Realism and the prominence of legal procedure in America,” see Paul MacMahon,  
Proceduralism, Civil Justice, and American Legal Thought, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 545, 584 (2013). 
136 “Clark was impressed with the [realists’] observation that one could not define what was a 
fact, evidence, or ultimate fact in a scientific way, and that such terms were best seen as a 
continuum, without logical cutoff points.” Subrin, supra note 132, at 966. 
137 See Burbank, Vanishing Trials, supra note 135, at 597-98; Edson R. Sunderland, An Appraisal of 
English Procedure, 24 MICH. L. REV. 109, 113-16 (1925) [hereinafter Sunderland, Appraisal]; Edson R. 
Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REV. 737, 738-40 (1939). 
138 See Sunderland, Appraisal, supra note 137, at 116 (“The spirit of the times calls for disclosure, 
not concealment, in every field . . . . ”); id. at 136 (“The legal profession alone halts and hesitates. If 
it is to retain the esteem and confidence of a progressive age it must itself become progressive.”); 
see also Burbank, Vanishing Trials, supra note 135, at 597-98 n.20. 
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Industrial Revolution through a campaign for what they called “legibility”—
we would say transparency. They contended that effective regulation was 
impossible without access to the facts concerning the regulated enterprise.139 
The system of broad discovery ushered in by the 1938 Federal Rules  
conferred on private litigants and their attorneys the functional equivalent 
of administrative subpoena power.140 
Thus, the architects of the 1938 Federal Rules constructed a broad  
highway for litigation that was free of some imposing obstacles characteristic 
of many other systems.141 The “highway effect” was not, however, evident 
for many years. More precisely, a small federal judiciary managed to dispose 
of a relatively small caseload without evident strain for more than twenty 
years after the Federal Rules went into effect.142 A fruitful way to home in 
on what changed—and what may explain the crowded federal litigation 
highway—is to consider conventional accounts of the so-called American 
litigation explosion. 
 
139 See Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the New American 
State, 16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 83-85 (2002). 
140 See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997); Patrick 
Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997). 
141 Of course, those who drafted the original Federal Rules were not free agents. On the  
non-academic members of the original Advisory Committee, see Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, 
Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1718 & n.184 (2004) 
[hereinafter Burbank, Role of Congress]. 
142 Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
yield the following case data for civil and criminal cases filed in district courts and for cases in the 
courts of appeals: 
 
Selected Civil and Criminal Case Statistics, with Authorized Judgeships 
  
District Courts Courts of Appeals 
Year Civil Cases Criminal 
Cases
Authorized 
Judgeships
Total Cases Authorized 
Judgeships 
1940 34,200 33,221 186, 2T 3446 57 
1945 52,568 
(28,359 OPA cases) 
37,437 189 2780 59 
1950 54,622 33,739 212 2830 65 
1960 57,521 28,137 241 3899 68 
1970 87,321 38,003 394, 1T 11,662 97 
 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS - FROM 1789 TO PRESENT, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/ 
JudgesJudgeships/docs/all-judgeships.pdf. For the hazards of using case filing data to determine 
workload, see supra note 117. 
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According to those accounts, the tremendous increase in civil cases in 
the 1970s143 was the product of a litigious population, an imperial judiciary, 
and an entrepreneurial bar.144 Whatever one thinks of the empirical basis for 
such accounts,145 within them lies an important clue to the willingness and 
ability of more and more American individuals and firms to sue in federal 
court. The American bar did not wake up in 1970 and decide to become 
more entrepreneurial. Contingent fee arrangements “have a long history in 
the United States.”146 Court decisions in the 1970s did disassemble some 
restrictive and anti-competitive rules of a self-regulating profession.147 
Much more important, however, was the fact that Congress provided 
incentives that made certain types of litigation which had not been  
financially feasible—or, if feasible, not sufficiently rewarding even on a 
contingent fee basis—promising opportunities for the investment of 
lawyers’ time and money.148 
Financial incentives, intended to encourage lawyers to represent those 
Congress endowed with a host of new statutory social and economic rights, 
were cabined by the substantive reach of the statutes providing them. In 
1966, however, the rulemaking process produced amendments to Rule 23 
that substantially expanded the scope of a trans-substantive financial 
incentive. That is because the 1966 amendments enlarged, potentially 
enormously, the domain of damages class actions, and such actions are 
subject to a judicially developed exception to the American Rule on fee 
shifting that permits one who has created a common fund to be reimbursed 
out of the fund.149  
 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. 
144 See FARHANG, supra note 4, at 13-14, 69. 
145 “Notwithstanding a decades-long organized campaign by American business to demonize 
lawyers and litigation, there is robust empirical evidence supporting [Professor Robert] Kagan’s 
observation that ‘[m]any, perhaps most, Americans are reluctant to sue . . . . ’” Burbank et al., 
supra note 7, at 646 (quoting KAGAN, supra note 13, at 34). 
146 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 739, 744 (2002). 
147 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 382, 384 (1977) (striking down Arizona’s 
ban on lawyer advertising); Burbank et al., supra note 7, at 647.  
148 See supra text accompanying notes 7-11. For an interesting and valuable account of the 
development of the plaintiffs’ bar as a business and the rhetorical challenges thereby posed for its 
champions in responding to anti-lawyer attacks, see Yeazell, supra note 34, at 1755. Professor 
Yeazell largely neglects, however, the role that statutory private enforcement regimes played in the 
evolution of the plaintiffs’ bar.  
149 See Burbank et al., supra note 7, at 654-55. 
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B. Procedure, Litigation, and Litigation Reform: 1971–1988 
As we have seen, once the power of statutory private enforcement 
regimes and of the revised class action rule to stimulate litigation on the 
broad highway created by the 1938 Federal Rules became apparent, the 
Reagan administration advocated, and legislative opponents introduced, 
bills to dismantle or undermine private enforcement regimes. But, the 
stickiness of the legislative status quo, coupled with “negativity bias” or an 
“endowment effect,” makes repealing or consequentially amending legislation 
that confers popular rights more difficult than enacting it in the first 
place.150  
The judiciary is not similarly constrained—although, of course, courts 
are subject to other constraints151—which helps to explain why, as we 
demonstrate in Part III, an increasingly conservative Supreme Court had 
greater success in retrenching private enforcement. Moreover, the judiciary 
need not wait for cases requiring the interpretation of federal statutes to 
affect the volume or mix of litigation. Effective control of procedure ensures 
that means are available for a judiciary that is ideologically distant or driven 
by institutional self-interest to frustrate legislative preferences by constricting 
access to court. 
1. Retrenchment by Rulemaking: A Brief Experiment 
The perception that the institutional interests of the judiciary—in  
particular, the interest in active judicial management of a burgeoning 
docket—were no longer in sync with the interests of practicing lawyers, 
coupled with the desire to control the agenda of litigation reform, likely 
played an important role in the decision by the Chief Justice of the United 
States, who appoints all members of rulemaking committees, to change the 
balance of power on the key committees.152 The original 1930s Advisory 
Committee did not include even one sitting judge.153 Representation of 
practitioners declined over time, but even in the 1960s, there were never 
 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. 
151 See supra note 123. 
152 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1714-15, 1720-23. “The risk of a rupture 
between federal judges and the bar was realized when, in response to a perceived crisis of expense 
and delay, judges pursued rulemaking strategies that either empowered them at the expense of 
lawyers and their clients (sanctions and active case management) or that simply disempowered 
lawyers (discovery reform).” Id. at 1722. For attempts by the federal judiciary to distance itself 
from the bar in this period, see Dana A. Remus, The Institutional Politics of Federal Judicial Conduct 
Regulation, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 47 n.71 (2012).  
153 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1714 & n.167. 
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more than three judges, nor less than seven practitioners, on the Advisory 
Committee.154 Under Chief Justice Burger, the key committees came to be 
dominated by judges, who are presumably more likely than lawyers or 
academics to protect institutional interests, as well as more susceptible to 
direction from on high.155 Moreover, Burger’s appointments of judges to the 
Advisory Committee markedly favored judges appointed by Republican 
Presidents, reinforcing our judgment that he sought to use appointments to 
influence the development of civil rules.156 Burger made no secret of his 
antipathy toward the “litigation explosion” of the 1970s, a phrase that some 
credit him with coining.157 One commentator observed that in the 1970s, 
“Chief Justice Burger frequently spoke out against what he and many others 
perceived as excessive litigation,” and that “[s]cholars have characterized the 
Burger-organized Pound Conference in 1976 as the most important event in 
the counteroffensive against notice pleading and broad discovery.”158  
In 1971, two months before he was nominated to the Supreme Court, 
Lewis Powell wrote a confidential memorandum to the chair of the Education 
Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, describing a “broad attack” on 
the “American economic system” and the steps that he recommended in 
response.159 Powell observed that “American business and the enterprise 
system have been affected as much by the courts as by the executive and 
legislative branches of government” and argued that “especially with an 
 
154 These data are drawn from a database of the Advisory Committee’s composition from 
1960 to the present that we have compiled in connection with our next paper in the ongoing 
project. During the entire decade, judges constituted on average 18.15% of the Advisory Committee, 
while practitioners constituted 55.10%. The remaining members were academics (23.16%) and 
representatives from government serving ex officio (3.59%). 
155 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1714-15; Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, 
Ruling Judges, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 229, 237-38. For evidence of Chief 
Justice Burger’s influence on the agenda and the rulemakers, see infra text accompanying note 172. 
156 See generally Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking:  
An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2014). 
157 Kenneth F. Dunham, The Future of Court-Annexed Dispute Resolution Is Mediation, 5 JONES 
L. REV. 35, 36 (2001). Although Burger clearly had major concerns with workload pressures, his 
critique of “litigiousness” also had a normative valence, reflected in his public statement that “mass 
neurosis . . .  leads people to think courts were created to solve all the problems of society.” Chief 
Justice Urges Greater Use of Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1985, at A21.  
158 Mike Tonsing, Symposium on Proposed Changes to FRCP: An Introduction, FED. LAW., Sept. 
2004, at 22, 25; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing 
Odyssey of Discovery “Reform,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 197, 207; Carl 
Tobias, A Civil Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615, 620 (2002).  
159 Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr.,  
Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Attack on American Free Enterprise 
System 1 (Aug. 23, 1971), available at http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/ 
PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf. 
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activist-minded Supreme Court, the judiciary may be the most important 
instrument for social, economic and political change.”160 He further  
contended that “[o]ther organizations and groups, recognizing this, have 
been far more astute in exploiting judicial action than American business,” 
singling out the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and noting that 
“[l]abor unions, civil rights groups and now the public interest law firms are 
extremely active in the judicial arena” and that “[t]heir success, often at 
business’ expense, has not been inconsequential.”161 Powell concluded that 
“[t]his is a vast area of opportunity for the Chamber.”162 
In 1980, Justice Powell, joined by two colleagues, dissented from the 
promulgation of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules on discovery 
that were designed to address the perceived problems of expense and delay 
in federal civil litigation, deriding the amendments as “tinkering changes” 
that would “delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms.”163 
Thus goaded to propose stronger measures, the rulemakers sought to 
establish litigation sanctions and case management as the prime weapons 
with which to attack cost, delay, and perceived excessive litigation. The 
sanctions proposals, in particular the proposed amendments to Rule 11, 
lacked empirical or jurisprudential foundation, which helps to explain why 
they were controversial and elicited widespread opposition from the bar.164 
Indeed, the opposition to the Rule 11 proposals was so strong that  
opponents almost succeeded in blocking the 1983 proposed amendments in 
Congress.165 The Democratic-controlled House passed a bill to prevent the 
proposed amendments from taking effect. In the Republican-controlled 
Senate, however, although “a bill to delay their effectiveness was sitting in 
the well of the Senate on the appropriate morning[,] . . . no one hauled it 
out.”166  
 
160 Id. at 26. 
161 Id. at 26-27. 
162 Id. at 27.  
163 Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980)  
(dissenting statement of Powell, J., joined by Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.).  
164 See RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE 
ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 3 (Stephen B. Burbank reporter, 1989) 
[hereinafter RULE 11 IN TRANSITION]; Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1722-23. 
165 Since blocking proposed amendments requires legislation, opponents must navigate the 
separation of powers and checks and balances gauntlet previously discussed. See supra text 
accompanying notes 71-73. 
166 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER 
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1984). 
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From sanctions and case management, the Civil Rules Committee 
turned its attention to Rule 68 on offers of judgment, which seeks to 
promote settlements through financial incentives that are keyed to a  
comparison of a rejected offer and a subsequent judgment.167 In 1983, the 
rulemakers proposed amendments that were ostensibly designed to enhance 
the Rule’s effectiveness, the most controversial of which was to add the 
opponent’s attorneys’ fees to costs as the price of guessing wrong about 
whether a judgment would exceed the offer.168 One of the problems with 
amended Rule 11 was that it could be, and indeed was, used by some lower 
federal courts effectively to reverse the American Rule by employing 
attorneys’ fees as the sanction for complaints found to violate the Rule.169 
The 1983 proposal to amend Rule 68 put at risk both the trans-substantive 
American Rule and one-way statutory fee-shifting provisions, notably those 
applicable to civil rights legislation.170  
It is suggestive of the Chief Justice’s influence on federal court rulemaking 
in the early 1980s that the Advisory Committee, all appointed by Burger, 
elected to forge ahead. It had barely survived the Rule 11 override effort and 
had been forcefully and repeatedly alerted to serious problems with its 1983 
proposal to amend Rule 68, including by Robert Kastenmeier, the  
Democratic chair of the subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee 
with jurisdiction over the federal judiciary.171 Encouraged by the Chief 
Justice,172 the Committee substituted a 1984 proposal that sought to obscure 
 
167 See FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
168 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 
F.R.D. 339, 361-67 (1983). 
169 See RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, supra note 164, at 10, 13, 37; Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1947 
(1989) [hereinafter Burbank, Transformation].  
170 See Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68—Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 425, 428 (1986) [hereinafter Burbank, Proposals to Amend]. 
171 In floor remarks on October 1, 1984, Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier argued that the 
1983 proposal “would have crossed the line from procedural to substantive [under the Enabling Act],” 
and that “Congress conferred a substantive right by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney Fee Award 
Act.” 130 CONG. REC. E4104, E4105 n.3 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
172 See WARREN E. BURGER, 1985 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 12 (1985). “The 
Chief Justice has nevertheless continued, both publicly and privately, to urge the adoption of [the 
1984 Rule 68 proposal and a proposal to amend Habeas Rule 9].” Letter from Nan Aron, Laura 
Macklin, Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & William Genego to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice 2 (June 5, 1985) 
[hereinafter Aron Letter], reprinted in Rules Enabling Act of 1985: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 190, 191 
(1985) [hereinafter 1985 House Hearing]. 
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the problems by switching from fee shifting to sanctions and from mandatory 
to discretionary consequences for failing to beat an offer of judgment.173  
Opposition persisted, including from Kastenmeier, who ultimately wrote 
a letter to the new Chair of the Advisory Committee giving notice that he 
was “very concerned” about the proposals.174 Indeed, as we discuss below, 
over the course of three hearings in the House from 1983 to 1985, proposals 
to amend Rule 68 came to occupy center stage in the discussion of changes 
in the Enabling Act process.175  
2. Changes in the Process of Making Procedural Law  
by Federal Rule: Lessons in Control Strategy 
The controversies over Rule 11 and Rule 68 in the early 1980s came on 
the heels of a decade in which Congress for the first time blocked proposed 
Federal Rules—the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence—from becoming 
effective, and thereafter blocked a number of other proposed amendments, 
albeit mostly proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.176 The 1970s was, moreover, a decade in which a number of 
thoughtful proposals for rulemaking reform appeared in the academic and 
professional literature, and in which a number of bills designed to implement 
reforms were introduced in Congress.177 In addition, the rule-specific 
controversies of the early 1980s came at about the time when (1) the Federal 
Judicial Center published a study, undertaken at the request of Chief Justice 
Burger, that comprehensively reviewed the arguments for and against 
changes in the Enabling Act process,178 and (2) the American Bar Association 
approved a policy that advocated substantial changes in that process.179  
Both the controversy concerning the Enabling Act process and  
controversies arising from specific rulemaking proposals led to a series of 
oversight hearings in the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives—
one each in 1983, 1984, and 1985. The hearings were convened at the  
 
173 See Burbank, Proposals to Amend, supra note 170, at 426-30. For the text of the 1984  
proposal, see id. at 428-29 n.20. 
174 Letter from Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier to Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Jr. ( July 31, 1985), 
quoted in Burbank, Proposals to Amend, supra note 170, at 440 n.81. Ultimately, however, the 
rulemakers did abandon ship. See Burbank, Proposals to Amend, supra note 170, at 439-40. 
175 See infra text accompanying notes 180-82, 200.  
176 See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 130, at 1018-20 & n.10. 
177 See id. at 1020. 
178 See WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 
(1981); see also Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 130, at 1020-21. 
179 See American Bar Association Policy on the Rules Enabling Act (1982), reprinted in Rules 
Enabling Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 46 (1985) [hereinafter 1983 and 1984 House Hearings].  
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instance of Representative Robert Kastenmeier who, as previously noted, 
was the Democratic chair of the subcommittee of the House Judiciary 
Committee with jurisdiction over the federal judiciary. The first hearing 
focused on general issues—in particular, on arguments that the Enabling 
Act process was insufficiently inclusive and insufficiently transparent. Much 
of the testimony at subsequent hearings addressed proposed legislation to 
implement comprehensive reforms that Kastenmeier had introduced.180 Yet 
attention at those subsequent hearings increasingly turned to the question 
whether the rulemakers had acted, or were proposing to act, beyond the 
limits of the Enabling Act, thereby subverting congressional preferences. 
The proposals to amend Rule 68 assumed greater prominence in the 1984 
and 1985 hearings, as did arguments that those proposals put at risk private 
enforcement regimes that Congress had carefully constructed to vindicate 
substantive civil rights law.  
Although some of the testimony and discussion at the House hearings 
lacked obvious ideological or partisan valence, it is difficult to so describe 
most of the testimony and discussion concerning Rule 68.181 A submission 
by the Alliance for Justice—an umbrella organization representing a wide 
range of liberal public interest groups—about the 1983 and 1984 proposals 
specifically linked them to unsuccessful partisan attempts in Congress on 
behalf of the Reagan administration to curb fee shifting.182 There was 
substantial overlap between the liberal public interest organizations (and 
their individual representatives) opposing anti–private enforcement moves 
in the legislative and the rulemaking processes.183 There was also substantial 
overlap between the organizations opposing the Rule 68 proposals, who 
sought to protect statutory private enforcement regimes, and the groups 
singled out by Powell in his 1971 memorandum as “extremely active in the 
 
180 See generally 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 179. 
181 Professor Staszak emphasizes the ideological and partisan motivation in the post-1994 rule 
reform activity of “Republican legislators and business lobbyists interested in retrenching tort and 
public interest litigation, primarily through class action reform.” Staszak, supra note 20, at 173; see 
also id. at 188. We agree, and we stress that there also existed ideological and partisan motivation 
among some who opposed the Rule 68 proposals and advocated rulemaking reform in the 1980s. 
Although it grew more intense in the mid-1990s, partisan and ideological conflict over the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure emerged in Congress in the early to mid-1980s.  
182 See Testimony of the Alliance for Justice on the 1984 Proposal to Amend Rule 68 Before 
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ( Jan. 28, 1985), reprinted in 1985 House 
Hearing, supra note 172, at 113, 144 (referring to the fee bill discussed in Part II, supra).  
183 Both the ACLU and the Alliance for Justice had publicly attacked the Reagan fee bill. See 
Barbash, supra note 44, at A25; Mary Thornton, Plaintiffs’ Legal Fess Attacked by OMB, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 12, 1982, at A21; see also Memorandum from Jonathan C. Rose to Edward C. Schmults, supra 
note 79.  
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judicial arena.”184 Burt Neuborne, then the National Legal Director of the 
ACLU, described the story told by the traditional rhetoric of procedure as “a 
myth” and intimated his willingness to acquiesce in “exempt[ing] . . . procedural 
rules from the traditional democratic process” only because (and so long as) 
the rulemakers produced “good rules” from his perspective.185 Like others 
testifying at the hearings—most prominently Alan Morrison of Ralph 
Nader’s Public Citizen Litigation Group186—Neuborne had in mind specific 
communities, in particular the civil rights community, whose views the 
Enabling Act process—with unrepresentative committees that did not 
actively seek a broad base of information—had tended to exclude.187  
 These hearings culminated in amendments to the Enabling Act in the 
100th Congress (1987–1988), which was the first in which Democrats 
controlled both chambers since the emergence of the civil rules controversies 
in the early 1980s. Scholars have disagreed about the extent to which the 
changes in the Enabling Act process that occurred during the 1980s and the 
changes that were formally prescribed by statute in 1988 should be attributed 
to the judiciary or to Congress.188 The dichotomy is misleading. A dynamic 
of institutional dialogue in the shadow of possible legislation yielded 
different results—different winners and losers—on a range of matters that 
were important to those seeking reform. Spurred by the rulemaking  
controversies of the 1970s and by the Chief Justice’s apparent willingness to 
consider reform, the judiciary had experimented with some changes prior to 
the congressional hearings convened by Representative Kastenmeier,189 but 
it was not institutionally committed to any of them until, avowedly in 
response to those hearings, the rulemakers finally made public a set of 
rulemaking procedures to which they could be held accountable (to the extent 
that a failure to follow internally generated procedures would have  
consequences).190 Moreover, the judiciary sought to maintain as much power 
and autonomy as possible. Its representative, Judge Gignoux, thus 
 
184 See Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., supra 
note 159, at 26-27; see also supra text accompanying note 156. 
185 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 179, at 150 (statement of Burt Neuborne, Legal 
Director, Am. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)). 
186 See id. at 28, 29-30, 35 (statement of Alan Morrison, Director, Pub. Citizens Litig. Grp.); 
see also id. at 272 (statement of Burt Neuborne). 
187 See id. at 147-48 (statement of Burt Neuborne). 
188 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1724 n.206 (discussing differing views of 
Professors Bone and Geyh). 
189 See, e.g., 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 179, at 4-5, 10 (statement of Hon.  
Edward Thaxter Gignoux, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
Judicial Conference of the United States). 
190 See id. at 90 (statement of Judge Gignoux). 
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continued to resist legislatively prescribed rulemaking procedures, arguing 
that legislation would lack adequate flexibility and was largely unnecessary 
given the action taken by the judiciary.191 He also continued to resist a 
requirement of open meetings.192  
The rulemaking changes urged upon, and in some cases statutorily  
required of, the federal judiciary were similar to changes that Congress had 
imposed on executive branch advisory committees and administrative 
agencies in the 1970s.193 In both domains, concern about abuse of delegated 
lawmaking power was attended by skepticism about the expertise of those 
exercising such power or the effective monopoly that deference to the claim 
of expertise conferred. In the 1988 legislation, Congress required rulemaking 
committees to hold open meetings preceded by “sufficient notice to enable 
all interested persons to attend,” to keep and make available to the public 
minutes of such meetings, and to provide an explanatory note with any 
proposed rule, as well as a report “including any minority or other separate 
views.”194 It also lengthened the minimum period before proposed Federal 
Rules promulgated by the Court can become effective from three to seven 
months.195 With these amendments, Congress ensured that interest groups 
with a perceived stake in the subject of proposed rulemaking could both 
provide pertinent information to the rulemakers and serve as whistleblowers 
in the event they thought something was seriously wrong. Congress also 
effectively increased the evidentiary burden on the Advisory Committee 
when seeking to change the status quo and increased the window of time for 
vetoing attempted rule changes.  
The goal was not to “control” the rulemaking function by taking it 
over.196 On the contrary, numerous participants in the lawmaking process 
 
191 See, e.g., id. at 90, 100, 103 (statement of Judge Gignoux). 
192 See, e.g., 1985 House Hearing, supra note 172, at 239, 249 (Statement of Hon. Edward T. 
Gignoux, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the 
United States); 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 179, at 11, 18-19 (statement of Judge Gignoux). 
193 See 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 179, at 33, 35 (statement of Alan Morrison, 
Director, Pub. Citizen Litig. Grp.); Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1711.  
194 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 Stat. 
4642, 4649 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(2), (d) (2012)) [hereinafter 1988 Act]. 
195 See id. 
196 Professor Staszak argues that by the 1990s “rulemaking authority had thoroughly  
shifted . . . to legislative dominance of the rulemaking process.” Staszak, supra note 20, at 183. In 
contrast, we emphasize that an oft-stated goal of 1980s reformers was to extricate Congress from 
routine ex post monitoring. In our view, the primary brake on rulemaking since the reforms of the 
1980s has not been Congress itself, where blocking a proposed Federal Rule is difficult, but the 
stickiness of the rulemaking status quo for which the reforms were in part responsible. Cf. Mathew 
D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 253-64 (1987) (arguing that notice-and-comment 
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leading to the 1988 reforms lauded them for reducing the need for  
congressional action at the end of the process.197 Reform was a control 
strategy designed, at the least, to free Congress from regular active  
involvement, easing the legislative costs of monitoring the rulemakers  
ex post. Such a strategy has no intrinsic ideological or partisan valence. 
However, the convergence of attacks by liberal public interest groups and 
Democratic members of Congress on specific products of one rulemaking 
process undertaken by a committee appointed by a Republican Chief 
Justice, and concurrent advocacy of changes to that process, reflect a more 
ambitious partisan or ideological agenda than is evident by considering 
either element in isolation. 
A study of the political origins of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) supports the hypothesis that New Deal Democrats changed their 
position on the APA in 1946 because they feared losing control of Congress 
and the presidency, and they were comfortable giving federal judges—most 
of whom had been appointed by President Roosevelt—the power to check 
the agencies they feared would come under Republican control. The New 
Deal Democrats’ support represented, in part, a strategic use of statutory 
process to increase the cost and political difficulty for administrative 
agencies to change the status quo, in particular the laws and regulations 
enacted by a series of Democratic Congresses and agencies in the New Deal 
period.198 This legislative strategy deployed formal administrative process in 
order to, among other things, empower and mobilize interest group  
monitoring of agency actions, and impose burdens of evidence and  
justification upon agencies seeking to change the status quo, thereby 
lessening the necessity of active oversight by Congress.199  
 The changes to the rulemaking process advocated and promoted by 
interest groups and members of Congress in the 1980s served similar 
strategic goals. ACLU National Legal Director Burt Neuborne’s testimony 
at the 1984 House hearing suggested a goal of using process changes to 
preserve “good rules” as the civil rights and civil liberties community would 
 
requirements overcome informational inequalities and, together with a requirement of written 
justification based on evidence, can empower groups to oppose administrative action and increase 
the costs of administrators to implement policies that are opposed); id. at 254 (“[A]n important 
function of administrative procedures is to provide a means of inducing bureaucratic compliance 
that does not require the time, effort, and resources of political actors.”). 
197 See, e.g., 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 179, at 33, 38 (statement of Alan Morrison); 
id. at 154-55 (introductory remarks of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier); Letter from Stephen B. 
Burbank to Hon. Robert Kastenmeier ( Jan. 13, 1984), reprinted in id., at 204, 213. 
198 See McNollgast, supra note 119, at 192. 
199 See id. at 198-99. See Generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
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define them.200 Under the 1980s reforms, the trans-substantive reach of 
Federal Rules assures monitoring by a broad swath of interest groups. Such 
monitoring should make it more difficult for the rulemakers to exceed their 
charter by providing a credible threat of whistleblowing if the rulemakers 
proceed with proposals deemed to be ultra vires, unsupported by evidence, 
or otherwise seriously objectionable.  
Unlike the situation under the APA, the courts are not realistically available 
to preserve the status quo by policing the Federal Rules’ compliance with 
the terms of the statutory delegation. The inadequacy of the Court’s 
jurisprudence interpreting the Enabling Act’s limitations was a source of 
complaint during the House hearings.201 Yet, even though a goal of the 
Enabling Act process reforms was to lessen legislative monitoring costs, a 
“second bite at the apple” is available to “organized interests that seek to 
preserve the status quo” through the provision requiring proposed Federal 
Rules to lie before Congress before becoming effective.202 
After 1988, as before, it is difficult to muster the forces needed to pass 
legislation that blocks a Federal Rule promulgated by the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, securing such legislation may be especially difficult because a 
vote against a proposed trans-substantive Federal Rule may help some 
constituents or interests while harming others.203 It is rather the 1980s 
process changes, combined with other influences promoting institutional 
self-restraint, that make bold reforms difficult to achieve.204  
Although Holmes famously observed that “[i]gnorance is the best of law 
reformers,”205 he did not mean that it produces the best law reforms. 
Traditionally, Federal Rules were more often based on limited anecdotal 
 
200 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
201 See, e.g., Aron Letter, supra note 172, at 233-34; Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Hon. 
Robert Kastenmeier, supra note 197, at 208-11. Indeed, as we discuss below, the courts have become 
the major venue for those who seek to change the status quo. 
202 McNollgast, supra note 119, at 181. “Perhaps, however, describing the phenomenon as one 
of redundancy is tendentious. In the absence of effective judicial review of court rules, (the 
potential for) congressional review becomes the only feasible alternative.” Burbank, Role of 
Congress, supra note 141, at 1725. For the current version of the “report-and-wait” provision, which 
gives Congress seven months to block a proposed Federal Rule or amendment, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2074(a) (2012). 
203 Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an  
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 885 (1975) (discussing the problem of congressional 
actions that “impose costs on all who use the courts, including various politically effective groups 
and indeed the beneficiaries of whatever legislation the current legislature has enacted”).  
204 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1736-37. 
205 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE  COMMON LAW 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963). 
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evidence than on systematic empirical data.206 To some extent, no doubt, 
their epistemic shallowness reflected the time and money necessary for 
empirical work. But it also well served a commitment not to let facts get in 
the way of reforms desired by the rulemakers and those who influenced 
them, and the rulemakers’ wish to be perceived as neutral, making choices 
behind a “veil of ignorance.”207 Empirical study is a threat to ignorance and 
thus to claims of neutrality.  
C. Bad Habits Die Hard: 1989–2000 
The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 demonstrated the power of systematic 
empirical data to discipline improvident rulemaking, albeit ex post, confirming 
the existence of an empirical vacuum underlying the version of Rule 11 the 
rulemakers replaced. Unfortunately, however, they were paired with 
amendments on required disclosures under Rule 26 that reflected the 
rulemakers’ determination to regain institutional leadership—an impulse 
that overwhelmed calls to wait for the fruits of experience.208 The fact that 
the disclosure proposals elicited a vigorous dissent from Supreme Court 
Justices209 and, as with Rule 11 in 1983, only barely escaped legislative 
override210 should have encouraged a return to empiricism, as recommended 
in the judiciary’s 1995 self-study of rulemaking.211 But bad habits die hard, 
particularly when they serve institutional or ideological interests. 
 
206 See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 841, 841 (1993) [hereinafter Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform]; supra 
text accompanying note 164. 
207 Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism 
of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079 (1989). 
But see Burbank, Transformation, supra note 169, at 1940-41 (“A ‘veil of ignorance’ may be an apt 
metaphor to describe federal rulemaking to date. It is not, I contend, an appropriate normative 
posture for the rulemakers of the future.”). 
208 See Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform, supra note 206, at 845. 
209 See AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS: 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 
103-74, at 104 (1993) [hereinafter H.R. DOC. NO. 103-74] (dissenting statement of Scalia, J., joined 
by Thomas, J. and, as to the disclosure rules, Souter, J.). 
210 See 140 CONG. REC. S7149 (daily ed. June 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Heflin) (“Both 
the House and Senate relevant committees concluded that the bar protests should be honored and 
that the rules should be changed; however, tangles in our own procedures prevented the more 
objectionable proposals from being deleted and all of the proposed changes went into effect on 
December 1, 1993.”). 
211 See A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcomm. on Long Range 
Planning to the Comm. on Rules of Practice, Procedure & Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 699 (1995). 
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Much of the Advisory Committee’s work during the 1990s was devoted 
to class action reform and to attempts to reach out to and reflect the  
concerns of the practicing bar. The latter were largely unsuccessful, as 
proposed amendments on jury size, which were supported by extensive 
social science research, and voir dire were squelched by the Judicial Conference 
and Standing Committee respectively,212 and the Chair of the Advisory 
Committee was not reappointed to a second term.213  
Under new leadership and with Congress under Republican control, the 
Advisory Committee relied on persistent calls from the organized bar and 
business community to “calibrate” discovery by restricting its scope,  
eliminating the right to subject matter discovery and making it available 
only upon a showing of good cause.  
One might draw the inferences from the Advisory Committee’s 2000 
note on the scope change that (1) some interest groups count more than 
others, and (2) those interest groups also count more than empirical  
evidence, at least if they are persistent.214 
Methodologically sound empirical data concerning discovery have been 
remarkably consistent in debunking claims of ubiquitous abuse or excess 
made by bar organizations and the business community over the last forty 
 
212 See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 
ALA. L. REV. 221, 243-44 (1997). 
213 In the last year of his three-year term, shortly before the Advisory Committee returned to 
discovery, Judge Higginbotham observed: 
 
Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys-general as an 
enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the securities laws, environ-
mental laws, civil rights and more. In the main, the plaintiff in these suits 
must discover his evidence from the defendant. Calibration of discovery is 
calibration of the level of enforcement of the social policy set by Congress.  
 
Higginbotham, supra note 140, at 4-5.  
214 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to the 2000 amendments; Paul V. 
Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. 
L. REV. 517, 520 (1998) (observing that “it is the persistence of complaints and questions about 
the merit of broad discovery and its expense that, at bottom, has caused the Committee to take 
another look”). Those inferences also find support in the breathless memorandum that Robert 
Campbell, the Chair of the American College of Trial Lawyers’ Committee on Federal Civil 
Procedure, sent to his fellow members in September 1999 to report the “extremely good news” 
that the Judicial Conference had “approved by a close vote the College proposal (substantially 
adopted by the Advisory Committee) to amend Rule 26(b)(1) changing the primary scope of 
discovery from ‘subject matter’ to ‘claims and defenses.’” Memorandum from Robert S. Campbell, 
Jr., Comm. Chair, to Members, Fed. Civil Procedure Comm., American College of Trial Lawyers 1 
(Sept. 16, 1999) (on file with authors). 
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years.215 From the perspective of putative abuse, in other words, the discovery 
landscape did not appear meaningfully different in the run-up to the 2000 
amendments than it had in 1980, when Justice Powell dissented from the 
promulgation of “tinkering changes.”216 Nor, alas, did the claims of those 
seeking to curtail discovery. An abiding lack of reliable empirical evidence 
did not cause them to change their tune, a strategy of blinkered persistence 
that finally paid off (with a different group of rulemakers).  
D. Procedure and Litigation Reform: 2001–2013 
1. Rulemaking as Democratic Legislation: The Stickiness of the Status Quo 
A commitment to reliable empirical data was critical to the abandonment 
of flawed rulemaking proposals in the decade after 2000, and prominent 
rulemakers cited that phenomenon as proof that the Enabling Act process 
works well.217  
The deeper epistemic foundation that results from an open process and 
from greater commitment to empirical study also helps to explain why 
rulemaking largely escaped controversy in that decade. Another important 
contributing factor was the rulemakers’ commitment to take the Enabling 
Act’s limitations seriously, whether prompted by the Rule 68 controversies, 
the Chief Justice’s inaccurate assurance in 1988 that they had always done 
so,218 or scholarly literature demonstrating fundamental errors in the 
 
215 See, e.g., EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf; Danya Shocair Reda, The 
Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085,  
1103-11 (2012) (discussing the 2009 FJC study); id. at. 1111 (“Nearly every effort to quantify litigation 
costs and to understand discovery practice over the last four decades has reached results similar to the 
2009 FJC study.”). 
216 See supra text accompanying note 163. 
217 See Mark R. Kravitz, David F. Levi, Lee H. Rosenthal & Anthony J. Scirica, They Were 
Meant for Each Other: Professor Edward Cooper and The Rules Enabling Act, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 495, 515-24 (2013); cf. Richard Marcus, Shoes That Did Not Drop, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 637, 637 (2013) (“[W]hat the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules does not do is, in some 
ways, as important as what it does.”). The phenomenon is not confined to court rulemaking. See 
Daniel Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam 
Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1318-19 (2012) (“One reason litigation politics have become 
so dysfunctional in recent decades is a lack of empirical data that can inform public debate.”).  
218 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a letter as part of a successful effort to persuade the House 
not to insist on eliminating the Enabling Act’s supersession clause, pursuant to which valid Federal 
Rules supersede previously enacted statutes with which they are inconsistent. Inflating the 
rulemakers’ restraint, the Chief Justice asserted that the rulemakers “have always been keenly 
aware of the special responsibility they have in the rules process and the duty incumbent upon 
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Supreme Court’s interpretations of those limitations and documenting the 
effort to change them in the 1988 legislation.219 This additional source of 
self-restraint also influenced the abandonment of rulemaking proposals and 
furnished additional evidence for those celebrating the Enabling Act process.220  
Opening the process to diverse sources of information, anecdotal and 
empirical, may have triggered institutional dynamics that were less likely to 
operate when rulemaking committees were dominated by non-judges and 
when rulemaking was the product of a “relatively cloistered culture.”221 
Smart people operating as part of a group may be perfectly willing to make 
decisions on the basis of their pooled reflections. Particularly if they can 
claim expertise or are confident about their power, they may also be willing 
to recommend bold action that they deem normatively desirable without 
worrying about empirical support and without any rigorous attempt to 
assess costs and benefits.  
However, when those people are judges, and when reason must be  
exercised on an evidentiary record more complete than “judicial experience 
and common sense,”222 they may be reluctant to become involved in  
controversies in which their decisions can be tarred with a political label. 
This is especially true when the decisionmakers’ monopoly of expertise is in 
question, in part because the effect of potential policy choices on substantive 
rights is plain for all to see. The rulemakers are not courts, and  
rulemaking under the Enabling Act is not an exercise of judicial power 
 
them not to overreach their charter,” and he further advised the House leadership that “[t]he 
advisory committees should undertake to be circumspect in superseding procedural statutes.” 
Letter from Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, to Rep. Peter W. 
Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 19, 1988), reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. 
H10,441 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988).  
219 See, e.g., Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 130, at 1023; see also Stephen B. Burbank, 
Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling 
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1029-36. The latter article discussed the legislative history of the 1988 
statutory reforms, which clearly signaled congressional unhappiness with the way in which the 
Supreme Court had interpreted the Enabling Act’s limitations.  
We have, then, a situation in which the body responsible for developing 
amendments to legislation sought through detailed legislative history to 
guard against the assumption that similar statutory language should be given 
the same meaning by the courts, while the expectations of the other body in 
that regard remain unclear.  
Id. at 1035. 
220 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1737 (discussing abandonment of  
proposals “to address in Federal Rules problems stemming from duplicative or overlapping class 
actions”); Kravitz et al., supra note 217, at 519-21 (same).  
221 Patrick E. Higginbotham, Iron Man of the Rules, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 627, 628 (2013). 
222 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
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under Article III. It is essentially a legislative activity, not a judicial activity, 
and federal judges are understandably reluctant to be seen as active 
participants in a political process. Although Chief Justice Burger did not 
succeed in extricating the Supreme Court from the Enabling Act process in 
the 1980s,223 Justices have been at pains to distance the Court from  
responsibility for the content of Federal Rules.224 
Finally (and relatedly), we believe that the influence of these institutional 
dynamics may depend on the qualities of those who lead the rulemaking 
committees. In that regard, during most of the period since 2000, perhaps 
the three most influential rulemakers for these purposes all had close ties to 
academia, which houses an audience likely to notice and reprove rulemaking 
proposals that lack empirical foundation, test the limits of the Enabling Act, 
or disproportionately burden identifiable groups of litigants.225  
Thus, the 1988 reforms assimilated the formal characteristics of the 
rulemaking process to those of the administrative process, and brought the 
landscape of rulemaking closer to that of the legislative process more 
generally. In combination with other influences promoting institutional  
self-restraint, their effect was to entrench the status quo and to render 
consequential reform by Federal Rule more difficult than it had been in the 
era of “undemocratic legislation.”226  
 
223 The controversies of the 1970s and early 1980s were “a threat to the prestige and influence 
of the Court itself.” Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1721. For the Court’s initial 
acquiescence in the elimination of its role in the process and subsequent change of position, 
compare Letter from Hon. Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, to Rep. Robert 
W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 12, 1983), reprinted in 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 
179, at 195, with Letter from Hon. Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, to Rep. 
Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary ( June 25, 1984), reprinted in 1983 and 1984 House 
Hearings, supra note 179, at 195. 
224 See Letter from Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, to Hon. 
Thomas S. Foley, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 22, 1993), reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 
103-74, supra note 209, at 1; see also Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform, supra note 206, at 842. 
225 See generally BAUM, supra note 123. The three individuals are Judge Anthony Scirica, 
Judge Lee Rosenthal, and former Judge (now Dean) David Levi. New leaders are now in place; 
the rulemakers are again considering proposed amendments to the discovery rules that are 
intensely controversial, and it is too soon to tell whether recent restraint will endure or was an 
interlude in an ongoing struggle for power. For comments on the current proposed amendments—
an astonishing number of them, exceeding 2350—and transcripts of the public hearings, see 
Proposed Amendments Published for Public Comment, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed-amendments.aspx (last visited May 12, 2014). 
226 See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284 (1978) (book 
review). Professor Freer recently criticized the rulemakers for hyperactivity, most of which in his 
opinion is aimed at trivia. He attributed the dearth of substantial rulemaking to a combination of four 
influences: uncertainty about the Enabling Act’s limitations, “congressional intermeddling,” 
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As one example, the rulemakers have recurrently flirted with proposals 
to tighten up the pleading rules in the years after the Supreme Court’s 
resounding 1957 defense of notice pleading in Conley v. Gibson.227 Even after 
two subsequent Supreme Court decisions that could be viewed as inviting 
rulemaking on the subject,228 however, they concluded that the game was 
not worth the candle, probably because any such proposal would generate 
significant controversy with inescapable political overtones.229  
As another example, starting in 2006, the rulemakers considered whether 
they should pursue potentially significant changes to Rule 56 on summary 
judgment. Conscious of potential Enabling Act objections and assured 
political controversy,230 however, they focused on proposals ostensibly 
designed to improve the process for ruling on summary judgment motions. 
They abandoned the most prominent of those proposals when testimony 
and written comments from numerous witnesses, including trial court 
judges, and empirical data demonstrated that it might not yield the benefits 
sought and could have a statistically significant adverse effect on plaintiffs in 
civil rights and employment discrimination litigation.231 Although cited by 
rulemakers as an example of the Enabling Act process working,232 the 
experience contributed to Gregory Joseph’s description of the rulemakers as 
having an “instinct for the capillary.”233 
 
“politicization of the rulemaking process,” and “inconsistent signals from the Supreme Court.” 
Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 
450 (2013). We regard this account as historically tone deaf and institutionally naïve. For instance, it 
ignores the controversies and rulemaking excesses that led to the process reforms of the 1980s, and 
the Chief Justice’s 1988 letter to Congress. The report-and-wait provision in the Enabling Act has 
always permitted Congress to “look over the [rulemakers’] shoulder,” id. at 473, and a major goal 
animating the 1988 reforms was to enable Congress to disengage. In addition, the account’s seeming 
celebration of closed-door rulemaking is both historically inaccurate and, in 2013, puzzling.  
227 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  
228 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Freer, supra note 226, at 464. 
229 See Burbank, Transformation, supra note 169, at 1953-54; Marcus, supra note 217, at 646; see 
also Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 
109, 117 (2009) [hereinafter Burbank, Pleading and Dilemmas] (“[O]nce entrenched . . . [notice 
pleading] became part of the status quo and thus was highly resistant to change through the 
lawmaking process that brought it forth . . . . ”). 
230 See, e.g., Memorandum from Steve Burbank to Michael M. Baylson & Lee H. Rosenthal 
3 ( Jan. 20, 2007) (on file with authors). 
231 See Kravitz et al., supra note 217, at 521-24; Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Peter G. 
McCabe, Sec., Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure ( Jan. 28, 2009) (on file with authors). 
232 See Kravitz et al., supra note 217, at 524 (concluding that the rulemaking episode resulted 
from “the robust, transparent, and highly effective process under the Rules Enabling Act”). 
233 Gregory P. Joseph, An Instinct for the Capillary, LITIG., Summer/Fall 2012, at 9, 9. 
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Finally, by way of example, the rulemakers studied possible class action 
reforms for more than a decade, supported by the empirical research of the 
Federal Judicial Center. The changes they recommended, which went into 
effect in 1998 and 2003, avoided the core elements of the rule and were far 
more restrained than class action opponents advocated.234 One of those 
changes, however, is of special interest for present purposes because it 
enabled and highlighted another path to civil litigation reform.  
2. The New Undemocratic Legislation: Making Procedural Law  
the Old-Fashioned Way 
a. The Cases 
A 1998 amendment to Rule 23, which permits courts of appeals in their 
discretion to entertain immediate appeals from class certification  
decisions,235 substantially expanded the opportunities for federal appellate 
courts, including the Supreme Court, to control the course of class action 
jurisprudence. And control it they have, to the point that the legal mechanism 
Congress chose to deal with abuses resulting from state courts certifying 
national classes was to enable most such cases to be brought in or removed 
to federal courts, where class action opponents had reason to hope that most 
of them would simply disappear.236 It was, again, a “procedural” mechanism, 
this time involving the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Most of this jurisprudence was first developed by the courts of appeals,237 
but in recent years the Supreme Court has focused on class actions. A 
majority of the Court has appeared to bless court of appeals decisions that 
made class certification more difficult by assimilating the governing  
procedures to trial procedures through the imposition of evidentiary 
requirements and burdens,238 thereby further ensuring that in most cases, no 
matter what the certification decision, there would be no trial.  
Although most of the changes in class action jurisprudence thus effected 
can plausibly be grounded in the interpretation of Rule 23, particularly as 
 
234 See Kravitz et al., supra note 217, at 519-20. 
235 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23( f) . 
236 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of 
Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942-43 (2006). 
237 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:  
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1495-96 (2008). 
238 See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 321 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
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amended in 2003,239 some Justices in the Court’s conservative majority have 
made little effort to conceal their hostility to class actions and the lawyers 
who bring them.240 It is thus no surprise that the concept of interpretation 
has been stretched to the breaking point, as it was on the question of 
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.241  
Examples from the domain of pleading provide the most vivid  
demonstration of both the power of the Supreme Court to reform litigation 
through supposed interpretation of Federal Rules, and the importance of 
historical, institutional, and political perspectives on litigation reform. We 
have seen that the framers of the 1938 Federal Rules rejected both common 
law and code pleading, criticizing attempts to identify “facts” as opposed to 
“conclusions,” and preferring discovery to pleading as the means to ascertain 
what happened.242 The Court embraced this approach in dictum in Hickman 
v. Taylor,243 and it embraced it squarely in its 1957 Conley decision, which 
can be seen as approval of the Advisory Committee’s previous rejection of 
calls for a return to fact pleading through rulemaking.244 Thereafter, in two 
cases decided over the ten year period from 1993 to 2002, the Court twice 
reversed lower court decisions that sought to impose heightened pleading 
requirements in particular substantive contexts, reasserting the traditional 
interpretation of the pleading rules and observing that change would have 
to come from the rulemaking process or from Congress.245 
 
239 See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 320 (relying on 2003 
amendments to Rule 23 for the conclusion that a trial court must “consider carefully all relevant 
evidence and make a definitive determination that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met 
before certifying a class").  
240 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dis-
senting) (“To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the 
usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”). 
241 See 131 S. Ct. at 2562, 2565-66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Alexandra 
D. Lahav, The New Class Action Landscape: Trends and Developments in Class Certification and Related 
Topics 12-13, 69-70 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 435, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2182035. For a more nuanced 
reading of Wal-Mart, under which it is less vulnerable to criticism on this ground, see Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1035-39 
(2013) (arguing that the Court’s Rule 23(a)(2) holding was driven in part by Title VII). 
242 See supra text accompanying notes 136-137. 
243 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). 
244 See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 90 (2009) [hereinafter Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access 
to Courts?](statement of Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Admin. of Justice, 
Univ. of Pa.). 
245 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); see also Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998); supra text accompanying note 220. 
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 Yet, as we have also seen, the status quo is difficult to change through 
legislation and, with respect to important procedural issues since the 
reforms of the 1980s, the rulemaking process. Indeed, inaction in the face of 
resurgent calls to move to fact pleading was one of the examples we gave of 
the stickiness of the status quo in contemporary federal court rulemaking. 
The Chief Justice not only appoints all members of the rulemaking committees; 
he meets regularly with the chairs of the key rulemaking committees. It is 
thus inconceivable that the current Chief Justice was unaware of the  
Advisory Committee’s decision not to pursue pleading reform. More 
generally, particularly because Chief Justice Roberts participated in the 
unsuccessful campaign for a broad fee bill as a member of the Reagan 
Justice Department,246 it is unlikely that he was unaware of the reality that 
consequential reform, if it were to occur, would have to come from the 
courts in the guise of interpreting existing Federal Rules.  
 Nor can the decisions avoid the charge of judicial lawmaking (here, 
judicial amendment) by the insight that judicial interpretation and judicial 
lawmaking shade into each other. The Court itself has provided an objective 
standard for distinguishing the two when a Federal Rule promulgated under 
the Enabling Act is in question. Thus, in order to protect the Enabling Act 
process, that statute’s limitations on rulemaking, and the power it accords 
Congress to review and, if necessary to block, prospective procedural policy 
choices, the Court has foreclosed from treatment as mere interpretation (or 
reinterpretation) the practice of giving meaning to a Federal Rule that is 
different from the meaning the Court understood “upon its adoption.”247 
The Court’s recent pleading decisions were certainly bold. Particularly 
when one considers that an effort to overrule them in a Congress controlled 
by Democrats failed rather miserably, they demonstrate the importance of 
institutions and institutional dynamics to litigation reform.248 On the basis 
of information provided in one case, a one-judge majority of the Supreme 
Court—whose members are unelected, serve for life, and are insulated from 
individual if not institutional reprisal—can bring about momentous civil 
litigation reform that would be impossible to secure from the legislature or 
its delegated procedural lawmaking bodies.249  
 
246 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
247 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). 
248 See generally Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?, supra note 244. 
249 We agree with Professor Staszak that such decisions are a good example of retrenchment 
through conversion once “barriers for authoritative change [through amendments to the Federal 
Rules] rose . . . . ” Staszak, supra note 20, at 188. As previously noted, however, we believe that the 
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Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal are a few recent examples of the Court 
using its Article III judicial power to achieve results that would have been 
very difficult or impossible to achieve through the exercise of delegated 
legislative lawmaking power under the Enabling Act. In addition, in our 
view, all of the decisions strained any principled distinction between judicial 
interpretation and judicial amendment. Finally, all of them involved 
“interpretations” that are inimical to private enforcement, and in most there 
was a clear divide in the votes of Justices generally thought to be conservative 
and those generally thought to be liberal.  
Having expressed concern in Part III that such accounts of litigation 
involving private rights of action, standing, attorneys’ fees, and arbitration 
may not reflect an unbiased (in the statistical sense) view of the Court’s 
decisions on those issues,250 we acknowledge the possibility of similar 
concern as to cases involving the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. We therefore turn here, as we did there, to statistical analysis of 
comprehensive data.  
b. The Justices’ Votes in Federal Rules Private Enforcement Cases 
We identified all cases from 1970 to 2013 in which the Supreme Court  
decided an issue that turned on interpretation of a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure, where the result would either widen or narrow opportunities or 
incentives for private enforcement. The search yielded 50 cases,251  
containing 51 issues and 445 Justice votes.252 At least one of the authors read 
each majority, concurring, and dissenting opinion in order to assign codes to 
 
primary source of these obstacles is the stickiness of the rulemaking status quo effectuated through 
the reforms we have traced. See supra note 196.  
250 See supra text accompanying note 92. 
251 The Federal Rules most frequently interpreted in these cases, in descending order of  
frequency, were: Rule 23 (class actions) (12 cases), Rule 8 (pleading) (6 cases), Rule 11 (sanctions) (5 
cases), Rule 56 (summary judgment) (5 cases), Rule 15(c) (relation back) (3 cases), Rule 50 (judgment 
as a matter of law) (3 cases), Rule 68 (offers of judgment) (3 cases), Rule 3 (commencement) (2 cases) 
Rule 23.1 (derivative actions) (2 cases), and Rule 24 (intervention) (2 cases). Rules 4, 16, 19, 37, 54, 59 
and 65 were at issue in 1 case each. 
252 We excluded from the data set cases that merely cited a Federal Rule, cases in which the 
decision of an issue did not turn on an interpretation of a Federal Rule, habeas cases, cases not 
implicating private enforcement, and cases in which the interpretation of a Federal Rule could not 
fairly be characterized as either pro– or anti–private enforcement. We acknowledge that, as a 
result, the data on which to base empirical analysis are limited. On the other hand, this is the full 
universe of cases that actually turn on interpretation of the Federal Rules and that bear directly on 
private enforcement. Moreover, the trans-substantive nature of the Federal Rules means that such 
decisions are often considerably more far-reaching than decisions interpreting the private 
enforcement provisions of individual statutes.  
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each Justice’s position: anti–private enforcement (=0), pro–private enforcement 
(=1), and missing if the Justice did not take a position on the issue.  
 
Table 6: Percent Pro–Private Enforcement Votes in Federal Rules Cases 
 
 
 
Justice 
Pro–Private  
Enforcement 
Votes (%)
 
Number 
of Issues
 
 
Conservative
Average 
Martin–Quinn 
Score 
  
Powell 27 15 1 .924 
Thomas 33 27 1 4.14 
Scalia 38 34 1 2.92 
Roberts 38 13 1 2.39 
Stewart 43 7 1 .478 
Rehnquist 44 36 1 2.86 
Kennedy 44 34 1 .986 
Alito 46 13 1 2.68 
Souter 50 20 0 -.814 
Burger 50 16 1 1.85 
O’Connor 50 30 1 .900 
White 56 25 1 .587 
Marshall 61 23 0 -3.16 
Ginsburg 64 25 0 -.875 
Blackmun 64 25 0 -.184 
Stevens 66 41 0 -1.47 
Breyer 68 25 0 -.698 
Brennan 77 22 0 -2.74 
Sotomayor 89 9 0 .241 
Kagan 100 7 0 .333 
  
 
  Table 6 lists the raw proportion of pro–private enforcement votes, 
relative to total votes, for each Justice who voted in more than five cases in 
our data, along with their conservative versus liberal designation according 
to the Martin–Quinn median and their Martin–Quinn score.253 Although 
the specific ordering changes as compared to our non-Federal Rules private 
enforcement cases (displayed in Table 4), the distribution from the lowest to 
highest ratio of pro–private enforcement votes is very similar. Dividing the 
 
253 See supra Section III.B. 
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Justices into conservatives and liberals in Table 6 demonstrates that it again 
effectively predicts whether a Justice is above or below the median ratio of 
pro–private enforcement votes in Federal Rules cases. Only Justice Souter 
defies expectations. Excluding this one Justice out of twenty, every  
conservative has a lower pro–private enforcement voting rate in the Federal 
Rules cases than every liberal.  
 
Figure 7: Case Outcomes and Justice Votes in Federal Rules Private Enforcement Cases 
 
Figure 7 plots a LOWESS curve estimating the probability of an  
outcome in favor of private enforcement in the Federal Rules cases over 
time, and the probability of votes in favor of private enforcement separately 
for conservative and liberal Justices. The figure reflects that the estimated 
probability of a pro–private enforcement Federal Rules outcome declined 
from 78% in 1970 to 34% in 2013. This decline occurred first with a 35 
percentage point drop in probability from 1970 to the late 1980s; a plateau 
for roughly two decades; and then an additional 9 percentage point decline 
in about the past five years. As with the non-Federal Rules private  
enforcement votes, the decline has been substantially driven by the votes of 
conservative Justices in the majority, whose estimated probability of a  
pro–private enforcement vote declined from 60% to 29% over this period. 
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The estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement vote by liberal 
Justices declined for the first decade of the series, plateaued from about 1980 
to 2000, and then increased significantly after about 2000. On net, liberal 
pro–private enforcement votes actually increased from 82% to 92% over the 
full period.  
What is perhaps most notable about this graph is that from 1970 to the 
end of the 1990s, the liberal and conservative probabilities of a pro–private 
enforcement Federal Rules vote moved in rough parallel, with liberals 
consistently about 20 percentage points more pro–private enforcement on 
average. After about 2000, however, the distance between the two groups of 
Justices widened considerably, ending the series separated by 63 percentage 
points in the estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement vote. By 
2013, as was true of the other private enforcement issues we analyze, 
outcomes on Federal Rules issues approximately converge with the votes of 
conservative Justices.254  
 
Figure 8: FRCP Private Enforcement Cases per Term, and Proportion with Dissents 
 
 
254 As noted in Part III, we acknowledge that there may be variation over time in the  
frequency of highly salient, large-impact cases.  
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Figure 8 reflects LOWESS estimates of the number of Federal Rules 
cases decided each year, and the proportion of them in which there was a 
dissent. The number of such cases on the Court’s docket grew from the 
early 1970s into the early 1980s, plateaued for two decades, and then spiked 
over the past ten years. The likelihood of a dissent follows a similar pattern: 
it grows from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, plateaus for two decades, 
and then spikes in the last decade, rising from an estimated 52% likelihood 
of a dissent in 2001 to an 84% likelihood in 2013. Although the percentage of 
dissents in the other private enforcement cases we analyzed increased 
during the same period, the growth was by only 4 (as opposed to 32) 
percentage points.  
Thus, our limited Federal Rules cases suggest significant changes over 
the past decade. The Court has devoted more attention to these issues on its 
docket; the decisions are more likely to produce dissents, and liberals and 
conservatives appear to be increasingly polarized in their voting behavior.255 
By contrast, with respect to the non-Federal Rules cases we analyzed, both 
the number of cases and the dissent rate have been relatively flat during this 
period, and although conservative and liberal Justices have continued to 
drift further apart in their voting behavior, the growth in polarization is 
notably less stark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 Scholars have made similar findings concerning the Court’s business decisions, and a 
similar phenomenon may explain both of these trends: “the increasing conservatism of the Court 
resulted in the Court’s taking cases in which the conservative position was weaker than previously, 
leading to more opposition by liberal Justices and hence to a higher percentage of liberal votes by 
those Justices in business cases.” Epstein et al., supra note 90, at 1470. An alternative explanation is 
that it took time for some of the Court’s liberals to realize what was going on. See Burbank, 
Pleading and Dilemmas, supra note 229, at 114 (describing failure of Justices Souter and Breyer to 
realize that Twombly could “fundamentally alter the role of litigation in American society” as 
“understandable but, at least in retrospect, naïve”). 
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Table 7: Logit Model of Justice Votes in Private Enforcement 
 Federal Rules Cases, with Case Fixed Effects 
 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect 
  
Ideology (Martin–Quinn) -.30* -.048 
 (.12)  
  
Ideology*Post-1994 Dummy -.80** -.128 
 (.25)  
  
N= 257  
Pseudo R2= .30  
***<.001; **<.01; *<.05  
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Justice 
   
 Table 7 reports logit models with case fixed effects. The models are 
parallel to those presented in Table 5 for non-Federal Rules private  
enforcement cases.256 The main effect of the ideology variable is significant. 
Because the interaction is included, this variable reflects the effects of 
ideology only in the period from 1970 to 1994. The marginal effect for the 
coefficient is -.048, which means that for each unit increase in a Justice’s 
Martin–Quinn score, there is a corresponding reduction of about 5% in the 
probability of a pro–private enforcement vote. Moving from the mean 
ideology score of a liberal Justice to a conservative Justice (as defined in 
Part III) is associated with a 17% reduction in the probability of a  
pro–private enforcement vote. It is notable that the magnitude of the effect, 
although substantively significant, is only about half of that observed in the 
models that pooled our other private enforcement issues. Thus, although 
there is clearly ideological voting on Federal Rules issues in the period from 
1970 to 1994, the cases are characterized by a notably smaller degree of it 
relative to our other private enforcement cases. Procedure in that period 
looks different.  
In the 1995–2013 period, the net effect of the difference between a liberal 
and a conservative grew to 62%. Relative to the effect of ideology in the 
1970–1994 period (a 17% difference), it grew by 167% in the 1995–2013 
period. Thus, the rate of growth in the effect of ideology for Federal Rules 
cases was much larger than we observed in the other private enforcement 
 
256 For our previous discussion of the details of the model specifications, see supra Section III.B. 
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cases. The effect of ideology in Federal Rules cases went from about half the 
effect in other private enforcement cases in the 1970–1994 period, to about 
the same in the 1995–2013 period. Indeed, as we discuss in the Appendix, 
after 2000 ideology had a materially larger effect in the Federal Rules cases. 
If procedure had once been less ideological, times changed.257  
Finally, we again acknowledge the many influences in addition to ideology 
that may have influenced the Justices’ votes in Federal Rules cases.258 As 
previously discussed, use of case fixed effects analysis requires some division 
among the Justices, with the result that unanimous decisions, where we 
would expect the influence of law and rule of law values to be greatest, 
cannot be included. Another influence that this approach does not permit us 
to measure is what we have called institutional self-interest. One of the 
Court’s Federal Rules decisions where that influence—in the form of an 
attempt to mitigate the difficulties and costs of seating larger juries, particularly 
in rural districts—may have played a major role is Colgrove v. Battin, a 1973 
civil case in which a five Justice majority upheld a district court rule providing 
for six-person juries against challenges under the Seventh Amendment, the 
Rules Enabling Act, and federal law requiring local rules to be consistent 
with the Federal Rules.259  
Yet case fixed effects analysis does permit us to measure with confidence 
the influence of ideology in divided Federal Rules cases implicating private 
enforcement. The results show just how far we have come from the  
traditional conception of, and rhetoric about, procedure as technical details 
or adjective law. 
 
257 As with our other private enforcement cases, we observe similar growth in the effect of 
ideology by running regressions on subsets of the data for 1970 to 1994, and 1995 to 2013.  
258 See supra text accompanying notes 113-117. 
259 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973). We agree with those dissenting Justices who argued that the 
Court distorted the meaning of Federal Rule 48 in order to find no conflict. See id. at 165 
(Douglas, J., joined by Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 185-86 (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J., 
dissenting). Because, however, we do not believe the result can reasonably be deemed either  
pro- or anti–private enforcement, we did not include Colgrove in our data set. In the 1990s, the 
institutional interests vindicated in Colgrove were joined by the institutional interest against 
disrupting courthouse construction plans that assumed smaller juries, and the combination sufficed 
to defeat an Advisory Committee proposal to return to a norm of twelve-person civil juries. See 
supra text accompanying note 212.  
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CONCLUSION 
Viewing the modern history of federal law that affects private enforcement 
in institutional context enables us to see that, in the long campaign for 
retrenchment that began in the Reagan administration, consequential 
reform has proved even more difficult to accomplish by statute than have 
other proposed changes to the status quo, particularly because the object of 
reform conferred rights with a substantial base of support in American 
politics. Recognizing that, as Lewis Powell had written in 1971, the courts 
were fertile and unploughed territory for such a campaign, those seeking to 
retrench private enforcement turned to that institution and were well 
rewarded. Litigation seeking to narrow private rights of action, attorneys’ 
fee awards, and standing, and to expand arbitration, achieved growing rates 
of voting support from an increasingly conservative Supreme Court, 
particularly over the past two decades.  
An institutional perspective that recognizes interactions and competition 
for power also enables us to see how the judiciary’s control of procedure can 
be, and has been, central to the campaign to retrench private enforcement, 
particularly in the last decade. Once a major element of the infrastructure of 
progressive private enforcement, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
became for a brief time the lawmaking territory in which a newly assertive 
institutional judiciary, intent through its leadership to dictate and control 
the reform agenda, sought to forge instruments of retrenchment. The 
ensuing controversies quickly animated interest groups and members of 
Congress protective of the procedural status quo to press successfully for 
changes in the Enabling Act process and in the rulemakers’ fidelity to the 
limits of the statutory delegation. Those changes—a product of institutional 
bargaining in the shadow of proposed legislation and of a promise to 
Congress by the Chief Justice—moved rulemaking closer to the administrative 
and legislative processes both formally and functionally, rendering bold 
reforms of the sort we associate with the era of “undemocratic legislation” in 
rulemaking difficult to achieve.  
Rulemaking is not, however, the only way that an ideologically distant or 
institutionally self-interested judiciary can frustrate congressional  
preferences concerning private enforcement. Because Federal Rules are  
trans-substantive, many of them are written at a relatively high level of 
indeterminacy and leave substantial interpretative discretion to the federal 
courts. Even when they are not so indeterminate, however, Federal Rules 
can be reinterpreted, at least by the Supreme Court, which is at no greater 
risk of override in doing so than it is when construing a statute. To the 
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extent that such decisions effectively amend the Federal Rules outside the 
Enabling Act process, they are today’s “undemocratic legislation.”  
Whatever one’s view about cases in which judicial interpretation seems 
indistinguishable from judicial amendment, data from all of the Court’s 
Federal Rules decisions confirm that, in this domain as well, the campaign 
to retrench private enforcement has had its greatest success in the courts. 
Indeed, it may be that the success experienced in the Supreme Court 
affected both the content and the zeal of the legislative campaign for civil 
litigation reform. Thus, although the issue of litigation reform in general— 
and procedure as a tool of litigation reform in particular—has been declining 
in Congress since the mid-1990s, it is now more prominent than ever for the 
Court.  
APPENDIX 
A. Models of Support for Litigation Reform Bills in Part II 
In our bill data models in Part II, the dependent variables are counts of 
the number of legislators sponsoring or cosponsoring litigation reform bills. 
Because the distribution of event counts is discrete, not continuous, and is 
limited to nonnegative values, it is best modeled assuming that the errors 
follow a Poisson rather than a normal distribution. A negative binomial 
count model is appropriate for data with this structure in the presence of 
overdispersion of the dependent variable, which is the case with the data 
analyzed here. Overdispersion is present where the variance exceeds the 
mean, violating an assumption of a standard Poisson model.260   
We cluster standard errors on legislator because standard regression 
models (without clustering) treat each legislator’s support for a bill as 
independent from her support for other bills, but episodes of bill  
support by the same legislator are not independent from one another.  
Non-independent observations add less information to regression estimates 
than independent observations. Clustering standard errors on legislator 
adjusts standard errors to account for this and thereby avoids standard 
errors that are too small.261 
For the models of the ninety-third to ninety-sixth Congresses (Table 1), 
and the ninety-seventh to the 111th Congresses (Table 2), we ran alternative 
 
260 A. COLIN CAMERON &  PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COURT DATA 4 (2d 
ed. 2013). 
261 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 
484-501 (5th ed. 2012).  
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specifications substituting common space NOMINATE scores for party. 
These scores are continuous measures of legislator ideology based on a 
spatial model of roll call voting behavior, and thus they are a granular 
ideology measure as compared to the dichotomous party variable.262  With 
this ideology measure substituted for party, we obtained results parallel to 
those reported in Tables 1 and 2 in terms of statistical significance, direction 
of effect, and rough magnitude.     
 In the models of the ninety-third to ninety-sixth Congresses (Table 1), 
we had in excess of 90% zeros in our dependent variables, suggesting the 
potential need for zero-inflated models.263 We replicated the models in 
Table 1 with zero-inflated negative binomial count models and obtained 
very similar results: statistical insignificance in the “All Bills” and  
“Monetary Recovery” models, and a significant negative coefficient of 
comparable size in the “Procedure” model.264   
The coefficients of a count model are not directly interpretable. In order 
to transform them into interpretable from, an x-unit increase in an  
independent variable translates into a factor change in the rate of the 
dependent variable given by exp(xβ). For example, for a coefficient .655, the 
factor change in the expected count for a one-unit change in the associated 
independent variable is given by exponentiating ((1)(.655)), which equals 
1.93. This means that when the independent variable is increased by one 
unit, holding other variables constant, the expected count increases by a 
factor 1.93. This is the equivalent of saying that the expected count increases 
by 93%.  This is how the marginal effects in Tables 1 to 3 were computed. 
B. Models of Justice Votes in Supreme Court Opinions in Parts III and IV 
 Because the dependent variable in these models is dichotomous, we use 
logistic regression, which is designed for dichotomous dependent variables.265 
We cluster standard errors on Justice for the same reason that we did so on 
legislator in the bill support models.  We computed marginal effects for 
these models with Stata’s “margins, dydx(*)” command.  
In the models presented in Tables 5 and 7, we included an interaction 
with a dummy variable that took the value 0 for the period 1970–1994, and 1 
for the period 1995–2013. We explained in the text that this dividing line 
 
262 KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). 
263 CAMERON & TRIVEDI, supra note 260, 139-42. 
264 These models were run using Stata’s zinb command. 
265 FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION (2000). 
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was selected based upon theory and evidence suggesting that the Court had 
greater insulation from legislative override, and that litigation reform 
became more salient, in the latter period. Considering the distance between 
liberal and conservative voting on private enforcement issues in Figures 4 
and 7 as a measure of politicization of these issues among Justices, the 
distance appears to have begun to widen noticeably in about 2000, after a 
period of stability. In alternative specifications, we moved the dividing line 
for the dummy variable from 1995 to 2000.  The main effects of ideology 
remain significant in both models. The marginal effects associated with 
moving from a liberal to a conservative Justice for the 1970–1999 period 
were essentially the same as for the 1970–1994 period (reported in Tables 5 
and 7). However, the marginal effects of ideology for the 2000–2013 period 
were somewhat larger than for 1995–2013 period (reported in Tables 5 and 
7). The distance between the mean liberal and conservative Justice is 
associated with 62 percentage points in the general private enforcement 
model, and 92 percentage points in the Federal Rules private enforcement 
model. Thus, when we isolate the most recent period we observe a materially 
larger ideological effect in the Federal Rules cases as compared to the other 
private enforcement cases.     
We ran the general private enforcement model (replicating the model in 
Table 4), and Federal Rules private enforcement model (replicating the 
model in Table 7), substituting Segal–Cover scores for Martin–Quinn 
scores. Segal–Cover scores are based upon pre-confirmation media coverage 
of Justices’ nominations, and therefore are based upon information  
independent of Justices’ voting behavior. Martin–Quinn scores are derived 
from Justices’ aggregate voting behavior in non-unanimous cases, and thus 
are susceptible to the concern of circularity in that we are using Justice votes 
to predict Justice votes. We note in this regard that our 317 private  
enforcement issues (combining both the models presented in Tables 4 and 
7) comprise a very small fraction of the total non-unanimous votes used to 
estimate the Martin–Quinn scores. Moreover, a key part of what we wish to 
understand is whether the Court’s private enforcement votes map to the 
more general left–right axis on the Court that we associate with the  
substantive policy positions that divide it. Still, Segal–Cover scores 
provide a useful robustness check.    
In Segal–Cover scores higher values are more liberal, but we inverted 
their direction to render them consistent with the Martin–Quinn scores. 
The results are presented in Table 1-A. Both the main effect and the interaction 
are significant in the general private enforcement model (Model 1). For the 
main effect, which is the influence of ideology on Justices’ votes in the  
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1970–1994 period, the marginal effect is -.42. The distance between the 
mean Segal–Cover ideology score of Justices designated conservative and 
liberal is about .36. An increase of this magnitude (in the conservative 
direction) renders a 15% reduction in the probability of a pro–private 
enforcement vote. Summing the marginal effects of the main effect and the 
interaction indicates that in the 1995–2013 period, there was a 39% reduction 
in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote moving from liberal to  
conservative. Both the main effect and the interaction are also significant in 
the Federal Rules private enforcement model (Model 2).  In the 1970–1994 
period, the marginal effect is -.25, rendering a 9% reduction in the probability 
of a pro-private enforcement vote moving from liberal to conservative. In 
the 1995–2013 period, there was a 37% reduction.   
The overall structure of the results is the same as with the  
Martin–Quinn scores. There was an ideology effect in both models in the 
1970–1994 period, and it increased sharply in the 1995–2013 period. Ideology 
played a notably smaller role in Federal Rules cases as compared to other 
private enforcement cases in the 1970–1994 period, but then experienced 
more growth in the 1995–2013 period, elevating the role of ideology in 
Federal Rules cases to about the same level as in our other private 
enforcement cases. The magnitude of the effects with the Segal–Cover 
scores is less than in models using the Martin–Quinn scores. This is probably 
explained largely by the fact that, because the Segal–Cover scores are based 
upon perceptions at the time of appointment but before confirmation, they 
effectively classify Brennan, Stevens, Blackmun, and Souter as  
moderate–conservatives.   
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Table A-1: Logit Model of Justice Votes in Private Enforcement  
and Federal Rules Cases, with Case Fixed Effects 
 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect 
  
 Model 1 (Private Enforcement) 
  
Ideology (Segal–Cover) -2.49** -.42 
 (.75)  
Ideology*Post-1994 Dummy -3.98** -.67 
 (1.47)  
  
N= 1739 
Pseudo R2= .28 
  
  Model 2 (FRCP)
  
Ideology (Segal–Cover) -1.35* -.25 
  (.69)  
Ideology*Post-1994 Dummy -4.24** -.77 
  (1.47)  
   
N= 257    
Pseudo R2= .22   
**<.01; *<.05  
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Justice 
 
